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This dissertation examines the role that management practices play in plant 
performance and addresses the many challenges that accompany efforts to measure 
accurately the adoption of management practices. 
I first provide background on a recent Census Bureau survey, the Management 
and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS), which measures management and 
organizational practices at manufacturing plants in the United States. Economists 
have long hypothesized that management is an important component of firm success, 
but until recently, the study of management was confined to hypotheses, anecdotes, 
and case studies. Building upon the work of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), the 
Census Bureau conducted the first-ever large-scale survey of management practices 
in the United States, the MOPS, for 2010. The Census Bureau conducted a second, 
enhanced version of the MOPS for 2015. 
 
  
Next, I use data from the MOPS 2010 to examine changes in establishment-
level management practices at approximately 12,000 continuing establishments 
between 2005 and 2010. I find that within-establishment changes in productivity are 
correlated primarily with practices related to performance incentives, particularly 
performance bonus practices. I present evidence that plants use performance bonuses 
as a channel of wage adjustment during the Great Recession, which explains most of 
the within-plant correlation between structured management practices and 
productivity. That is, negative demand shocks during the Great Recession negatively 
affect both measured productivity and the availability of bonuses and manufacturing 
plants. There is limited evidence that changes in bonus practices for reasons other 
than demand shocks have an impact on plant outcomes over the period from 2005 to 
2010. 
Finally, I present further background on the cognitive testing practices that the 
Census Bureau used to develop the MOPS. Because management is an intangible 
input into plant production functions, it is not as easily measured as conventional 
inputs such as labor or capital. Pretesting was essential to ensure that quality data was 
collected. The results of the pretesting process provide insight into how respondents 
interpret the MOPS questionnaire, including the questions related to bonus practices, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 Does management matter for business performance? If so, are there specific, 
transferable practices that are associated with success? Can management be learned? 
How much of management is embodied in the manager and how much can be 
institutionalized? How does one measure management? 
 This flurry of questions has vexed economists and business people for 
generations, but answering the last question is key to unlocking the answers to all of 
the preceding questions. This dissertation covers one possible answer, a new Census 
Bureau dataset, the Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS). This 
dataset, developed in partnership with researchers from Stanford University and MIT, 
is the first large-scale attempt to measure management practices in the United States. 
 One module of the MOPS covers a set of structured management practices: 
practices related to performance monitoring, targeting, and incentives that are 
explicit, formal, frequent, and specific. These questions can be used to create a 
measure of the degree of structure in a plant’s management practices. 
 Although the MOPS is the first survey of its kind, it did not arise out of a 
vacuum. It follows in a rich tradition of survey data to measure management, and 
builds on several innovative predecessors. The second chapter of this dissertation 
discusses the development of the MOPS and its context. That chapter details the 
content of the MOPS related to management, organizational practices, data in 
decision making, and uncertainty. 
 The third chapter of this dissertation utilizes the MOPS data directly to 





management, I find that structured management practices are positively correlated 
with plant-level outcomes such as productivity and employment growth. However, I 
find that within-plants, most of the correlation between changes in management 
practices and changes in productivity can be explained by changes in the availability 
of bonuses. 
 This finding highlights the complexity of measuring management. Plants may 
change the availability of bonuses for several reasons. Bonuses may become more or 
less available based on management decisions to incentivize workers, or they may 
become more or less available based upon demand shocks that affect the cash flow of 
the business. If the latter effect dominates, it weakens the argument that changes in 
structured management practices have a causal impact on firm outcomes. I find 
evidence that changes in bonuses are demand-driven, but limited evidence that 
changes in bonus practices for reasons other than demand shocks have an impact on 
plant productivity. 
 The key distinction in the third chapter is between the plant’s policies related 
to bonuses and its realization of those policies. The intent of the MOPS is to measure, 
amongst other things, the management policies of the respondent plants. Taking 
bonuses as an example, the intent is to ask, “in normal economic conditions, what 
share of workers would be eligible for bonuses?” However, with survey data, 
respondents are free to interpret questions as they see fit. This may lead respondents 
to answer instead “what share of workers received bonuses?” The answer to this 






 The final chapter of this dissertation is an exploration of how the MOPS was 
tested and written in order to address these concerns. All survey data is susceptible to 
the risk that some respondents misinterpret the questions. The Census Bureau 
rigorously pretests all surveys prior to fielding them. However, because management 
is, by definition, a less concrete concept than traditionally measured inputs such as 
capital and labor, the respondent’s interpretation is more difficult to gauge or predict. 
The last chapter offers insight into just how respondents understood questions during 
pretesting. It provides useful information for researchers hoping to use the MOPS 
data or conduct their own research on management. It also provides further context 





Chapter 2: The Management and Organizational Practices 
Survey: An Overview1 
(with Cathy Buffington, Lucia Foster, and Ron Jarmin) 
Introduction 
As noted above, the important role of management in the success of firms has 
long been stressed by academics in business and management, the media, and 
consultants, but most evidence has been anecdotal or based primarily on case studies. 
In this chapter, we describe one of the innovative steps forward in measuring 
management practices: the development and fielding of the first ever large-scale 
survey of management in the United States, the Management and Organizational 
Practices Survey (MOPS). The MOPS was developed as a partnership between the 
Census Bureau and an external research team of Nick Bloom (Stanford), Erik 
Brynjolfsson (MIT), and John Van Reenen (MIT), and later Steven Davis (University 
of Chicago) and Kristina McElheran (University of Toronto), and was sent to about 
50,000 manufacturing establishments in 2011 and 2016. In this chapter, we provide 
the background and motivation for developing the MOPS by describing the existing 
empirical literature on management practices, uncertainty, and data and decision 
making.  
Already the MOPS has had wide-ranging impacts on the study of management 
practices worldwide, as questions based on the MOPS have been or will soon be 
                                                 
 
1 This paper is adapted from a working paper co-authored with Cathy Buffington, Lucia Foster, and 
Ron Jarmin and issued as part of the Center for Economic Studies (CES) Working Paper series. 





issued as part of censuses in Canada, Germany, Pakistan, Japan, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom (Haltom and Bloom, 2014). The statistical agencies of Pakistan and 
Mexico have issued surveys that were adapted from the MOPS, although these 
surveys were conducted face-to-face rather than with paper instruments or 
electronically due to the fact that mail and e-mail were considered unreliable for 
contacting firms (Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, Scur, and Van Reenen; 2016). 
While economists have been interested in the structure of the firm since at 
least the birth of the modern profession,2 it has only been in the post-war period that 
management has been considered explicitly in the study of firms. Early “managerial” 
models of the firm (Marris, 1964) focus on principal-agent problems, wherein a 
manager of a firm may seek to solve a different objective than her profit-maximizing 
employer. A small theoretical literature developed around a more robust model of the 
role of management in firm structure starting in the early 1990’s, but meaningful 
empirical studies of the role of management began to supplement these early theories 
only much later. 
 The theoretical literature on management that developed starting with Radner 
(1992) largely focused on incorporating the anecdotal evidence available in the 
business press and aggregate data into models of firm structure. Radner’s (1992) 
interest in management stems largely from the observation that the growing number 
of large firms must require a more complex internal structure than allowed by the 
simple model of a profit-maximizing agent, or even a principal-agent model. While 
                                                 
 
2 Syverson (2011) notes that academic writing on the importance of management for profitability dates 





Radner’s (1992) motivations are not rooted in extensive empirical study of the role of 
management, this small literature has had far-reaching implications, including 
motivation for macroeconomic models of rational inattention (Adam, 2007). Milgrom 
and Roberts (1990) propose a theoretical model of technological adoption that 
exhibits complementarities with changes in work practices and firm organization. 
 Recent findings on productivity have shown that there is significant and 
persistent dispersion of productivity across firms and even establishments that can 
only partially be explained by differences in inputs (Syverson, 2004), production 
technologies, price heterogeneity (Foster, Haltiwanger, and Syverson; 2008), and 
idiosyncratic shocks (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). Based on pre-existing theoretical 
research and anecdotal evidence regarding the importance of management practices, 
the hypothesis was put forward that perhaps management practices could account for 
some of the firm- and establishment-level heterogeneity in productivity. 
 Unlike these studies of firm- and establishment-level heterogeneity in 
productivity, which were made possible by the availability of representative or even 
population-level microdata from government sources, empirical studies of 
management were virtually non-existent until ten years ago. Syverson (2011) goes so 
far as to state that “perhaps no potential driver of productivity differences has seen a 
higher ratio of speculation to actual empirical study.” Several recent studies have 
begun to alter this ratio, however, making creative use of existing datasets. 
Bertrand and Schoar (2003) use publically available data to match CEOs to firm 
performance and find that CEO demographic data predict management style. 





examine the impact of changing management practices on productivity in industry-
specific samples of steel finishing and valve manufacturing plants, respectively. 
Ichniowski et al. (1997) and Bartel et al. (2007) develop specific surveys of the 
human resource management practices for their respective samples; the latter also 
considers complementary IT investment. Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen, 
and Zilibotti (2007) use measures of decentralization from two French data sets 
(Changements Organisationnels et Informatisation and Enquête Response) and a 
British data set (Workplace Employee Relations Survey) as proxies for delegation of 
decision making to managers. Related work by McElheran (2014) links the private 
Harte Hanks Computer Intelligence database to performance data from the 1997 
Census of Manufactures to examine decentralization of decision making within multi-
unit firms. 
In addition, a sizeable literature in the field of development economics has 
taken shape over the past five years focusing on the business training of 
microenterprises. This literature is primarily experimental in nature, offering business 
training to selected entrepreneurs, with mixed results.3 For example, Bloom, Eifert, 
Mahajan, McKenzie, and Roberts (2013) conducted a field experiment on 17 Indian 
textile firms having between 100 and 1,000 employees wherein the experimental 
firms were given management training, and performance was extensively monitored 
during and after the training period. 
                                                 
 
3 See Karlan, Knight, and Udry (2012) and McKenzie and Woodruff (2012) for surveys of this 
literature. De Mel, McKenzie, and Woodruff (2014) also constructed a survey tool to gauge the 






More ambitious direct measurement efforts have also taken shape. Several 
large-scale, multi-industry surveys were recently developed and administered. One of 
these, the World Management Survey (WMS), is of special interest since it has served 
as a starting point of a sort for the MOPS. The WMS, started in 2004, has run 
extensive double-blind telephone interviews on management practices with over 
11,300 organizations in manufacturing across 34 countries between 2004 and 2014, 
and its methodology has been extended to samples in the retail, education, and 
healthcare industries in that time. As detailed below, the WMS has been adapted by 
international organizations for a survey and Statistics Canada has also developed two 
related surveys. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: we provide an overview of existing surveys 
of management, followed by a discussion of the core content of the MOPS. We then 
discuss the two modules added to the MOPS for 2015, “Data and Decision Making” 
and “Uncertainty.” Finally, we provide discussion of future directions and conclude. 
Existing Management Surveys and Research 
Management practices have long been used as an explanation for the residual 
firm- and establishment-level heterogeneity in productivity that could not be 
explained by other, more measurable factors, even in the absence of strong empirical 
support. However, increasingly economists and government agencies have conducted 
surveys in an effort to measure management practices. Tables 2.1 and 2.2 provide an 
overview of these surveys; we discuss each in turn below. 
The most widely cited empirical study of management at this time, the WMS, 





management practices. A summary of the practices of the WMS is offered in Bloom, 
Lemos, Sadun, Scur, and Van Reenen (2014b) and a synopsis is given here.4 The 
WMS hires students in Master of Business Administration (MBA) or similar 
programs to call mid-level managers of firms in manufacturing, healthcare, education, 
and retail in 20 countries. Each interview is conducted in the native language of the 
interviewee, and the calls last 45 minutes on average. The interview questions are 
open-ended, and then the interviewers score the responses on a scale from one (worst) 
to five (best). 
The interviewee is not aware that the responses are scored, nor is the 
interviewer provided information about the firm’s performance when conducting the 
interview; moreover, the sample firms are chosen so that the interviewer is unlikely to 
have prior knowledge of the firm. The firms’ performance and financial data are 
obtained from independent sources. The interviewees are randomly selected from the 
population of all medium-sized firms in the given industry and country, defined as 
manufacturing and retail firms that have 50-500 employees, hospitals that deliver 
acute care, and schools that educate 15-year-old students. 
The questions asked of the interviewee fall into three categories: monitoring, 
targeting, and incentives/personnel management. The questions on monitoring ask the 
extent to which firms measure performance within the firm and use that data (if 
collected) to improve performance. The questions on targeting attempt to gauge how 
well firms set forward-looking goals and course correct if those goals are not met. 
                                                 
 






Incentives/personnel management questions examine how employees are promoted, 
rewarded, and retained, or alternately reprimanded and dismissed. 
Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) present the first results of the WMS, finding 
that greater implementation of  structured management practices -- that is, increased 
monitoring of firm activity, implementation of clear targeting practices, and the 
presence of strong incentives for achieving the establishment’s targets --  is associated 
with higher productivity, profitability, and survival rates. They also compare cross-
country results and find that U.S. firms generally implement more structured 
management practices than European firms, although there remain high levels of 
within-country dispersion of practices. Poor management practices are frequently 
associated with weaker competitive pressures and firms practicing primogeniture.  
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012b) examine the management practices 
of multi-national firms and find that firms with establishments in countries with high 
levels of trust tend to decentralize decision making. Establishments of multinational 
firms tend to have high levels of structured management practice implementation in 
general. Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2015) find that private equity owned firms 
have more structured management practices than do government, family, or privately-
owned firms, particularly in monitoring practices. Private equity owned firms are also 
more likely to be structured in a way that grants more autonomy to individual 
establishments relative to other types of firms. 
Bloom et al. (2014b) note that there are high levels of dispersion in adoption 
of structured management practices across schools (Bloom, Lemos, Sadun, and Van 





government-run schools and hospitals generally having lower scores on structured 
management scores than their privately-owned counterparts. Other users of the WMS 
methodology have found a spectrum of adoption of structured management practices 
in foster care, adoption, and nursing homes (Delfgaauw, Dur, Propper, and Smith; 
2011); tax agencies in OECD countries (Dohrmann and Pinshaw, 2009); public-
private partnerships (Homkes, 2011); substance abuse clinics (McConnell, Hoffman, 
Quanbeck, and McCarty; 2009); UK university departments (McCormack, Propper, 
and Smith, 2013); tradable service firms in Ireland (McKinsey and Company, 2009); 
Nigerian civil service (Rasul and Rogger, 2013); and American hospitals and cardiac 
care units (McConnell, Lindrooth, Wholey, Maddox, and Bloom; 2013, 2016). Rasul 
and Rogger (2015) also find that ethnic diversity at public sector organizations in 
Nigeria is positively correlated with structured management practices. Rahaman and 
Al Zaman (2013) combine the Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) WMS data set with 
Loan Pricing Corporation DealScan data to show that structured management 
practices are negatively correlated with interest rates on corporate loans and that firms 
with more structured practices are more likely to borrow from more reputable lenders 
than firms with less structured practices. 
In 2008 and 2009, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
and the World Bank adapted the WMS to conduct the Management, Organisation, 
and Innovation survey (MOI) to study management practices in 10 transition 
countries. Although the 12 questions on the MOI survey instrument were adapted 
from the WMS, the questions were closed rather than open-ended, and interviews 





Schweiger, and Van Reenen (2012c) find that management scores in Central 
European transition countries are quite similar to management scores in Western 
Europe, while Central Asian transition countries trail other developing Asian 
countries in structured management practice adoption. 
The National Employer Survey (NES), conducted by the Census Bureau over 
three waves (1993, 1997, and 2000), asked questions related to employees and 
employment, employee training, business characteristics, and equipment and 
technology. The NES had 3,358 respondents for 1993 and 5,465 respondents for 1997 
(and a longitudinal component).5 Supplements on partnerships between employers 
and schools were conducted by telephone interview in 1996 and 1998. A third wave 
of the NES was run in 2000, sampling 2,825 establishments that responded to the 
second wave of the survey as well as 50 employees each for 225 matched 
establishments. The establishment component of the NES, which was a joint venture 
with the National Center for the Educational Quality of the Workforce, was 
conducted as a computer-aided telephone interview of plant managers.  
Cappelli and Neumark (2001) use NES data and find weak evidence of a 
positive impact of increased decision making power for employees on productivity. 
Black and Lynch (2001) find that unionized establishments with increased worker 
decision making have higher productivity than do similar nonunion establishments 
and unionized firms with traditional decision making structures. Establishments 
whose employees have higher education levels are more productive than 
                                                 
 





establishments with lower education levels, and establishments with more computer 
usage by non-managers are more productive than establishments where non-managers 
are less likely to use computers. 
Statistics Canada conducted the Workplace and Employee Survey (WES) 
annually on a representative sample of approximately 10,000 to 15,000 
establishments between 1999 and 2006. The survey included questions on 
compensation, training, human resources practices, organizational change, 
performance, business strategy, innovation, and technology use. Statistics Canada 
also ran the Survey of Innovation and Business Strategy on roughly 4,000 and 8,000 
establishments in 2010 and 2013, respectively. The establishments were drawn from 
fourteen industries as defined by the North American Industry Classification System 
(NAICS). The survey sought to gather information on monitoring, structure, use of 
advanced technology, human resource management, and other business strategies. 
Statistics Canada’s WES was conducted in two parts: a computer-aided phone 
survey administered to employers and a telephone interview conducted with 
employee participants.6 The survey covered a longitudinal sample of establishments, 
with approximately 9,000 establishments selected in 1999, and with new 
establishments gradually added (and naturally other establishments exiting), leading 
to a sample of approximately 15,000 units in 2005. The establishments were selected 
to be representative of workplaces in Canada. The employer survey consisted of 50 
questions divided into nine sections: workforce characteristics and job organization, 
                                                 
 






compensation, training, human resources practices, collective bargaining, workplace 
performance, business strategy, innovation, and technology use. 
The employee sample consisted of no more than 24 randomly-selected 
employees per establishment, with an annual sample of about 20,000 workers. 
Employees are surveyed for two years, and then a new sample is drawn. The 
employee survey consisted of 59 questions across ten categories: job characteristics, 
computers and other technologies, training and development, career-related training, 
employee participation, personal and family support programs, worker representation 
and industrial relations, compensation, work history/turnover, and demographics. 
Yang, Kueng, and Hong (2015) use the employer component of the WES to 
show that adoption of particular structured management practices is strongly 
correlated with particular business strategies of for-profit firms. These strategies are: 
novelty, low-cost, and high-quality. Firms pursuing “novelty” strategies seek to 
provide a good or service that is unique in itself. Firms pursuing low-cost or high-
quality strategies seek to compete on either cost or quality. Low-cost firms tend to 
delegate more to managers, whereas novelty firms tend to implement more autonomy 
for all workers. Both high-quality and novelty firms are likely to implement 
structured management practices related to incentives. Hong, Kueng, and Yang 
(2015) also use the employer component of the WES to show that performance-based 
pay systems are complementary to decentralization of decision making from 
principals to managers. 
The Survey of Innovation and Business Strategy (SIBS), also from Statistics 





establishments in 14 NAICS industries in 2010 and 2012, respectively.7 The survey 
consisted of over 100 questions on business strategies and monitoring, enterprise 
structure, operational activities, relocation of activities in to and out of Canada, sales, 
relationships with suppliers, technology usage, innovation, structured management 
practices, and use of government support programs. This survey was sent to 
establishments both as a paper and an electronic survey form. 
Brouillette and Ershov (2014) use the SIBS to construct a measure of 
management practices that is analogous to the index created by Bloom and Van 
Reenen (2007) and find that larger firms implement more structured practices. They 
find that this measure is positively correlated with a measure of business innovation 
for all sectors, but only in manufacturing industries are structured practices positively 
and significantly correlated with sales and profits. 
Management and Organizational Practices Survey 
The Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS) collects 
information on targeting, monitoring and incentives managerial practices; the locus of 
decision making within the organizational structure of the firm to which the 
establishment belongs; and related background information from a sample of U.S. 
manufacturing establishments.8 The 2010 survey consisted of 37 questions in three 
sections: management practices, organization, and background characteristics. The 
                                                 
 
7 For more information on the SIBS, visit 
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2015 survey consists of 47 questions covering the original (modified) sections and 
new sections on data and decision making and uncertainty. We first discuss the 
overall sample and collection strategies and the three common sections, and then 
discuss the two new modules.  Appendices A and B contain the complete instruments 
for 2010 and 2015, respectively. 
Sampling, Collection, and Dissemination Strategies 
The sample for the MOPS consists of the approximately 50,000 
establishments in the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) mailout sample. The 
mailout sample for the ASM is redesigned at 5-year intervals beginning the second 
survey year subsequent to the Economic Census. (The Economic Census is conducted 
every five years in years ending in ‘2’ or ‘7.’) For the 2009 and 2014 survey years, a 
new probability sample was selected from a frame of manufacturing establishments 
of multi-location companies and large single-establishment companies in the 2007 
and 2012 Economic Census, which surveys establishments with paid employees 
located in the United States. The size of this sampling frame was approximately 
101,250 establishments in 2014. Using the Census Bureau’s Business Register, the 
mailout sample was supplemented annually by new establishments, which have paid 
employees, are located in the United States, and entered business in 2008 – 2010 or 
2013 – 2015.9 
                                                 
 
9 This paragraph is the official methodological documentation for the 2010 MOPS, which can be found 
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The MOPS is conducted using paper and electronic survey instruments; the 
respondent may select the reporting mode. The MOPS is sent in the spring of the year 
after the reference year (April 2011 for MOPS 2010, May 2016 for MOPS 2015).  
Most Census Bureau surveys, including the ASM, are mailed to the firm’s business 
address in the BR. For single-establishment firms, this is the business mailing 
address.10 For multi-unit firms, forms for all establishments in the sample are usually 
grouped and sent to the business mailing address, which is often the firm’s 
headquarters, with instructions for the survey coordinator to distribute forms to the 
respondent plants as necessary.11 
Because the MOPS asks respondents about practices that may vary across 
plants within a multi-unit firm and information about those practices may not be 
known at the firm level, the MOPS follows a unique mail strategy. For plants in 
multi-unit firms, the MOPS is mailed to the establishment physical address of the 
plant rather than to the firm’s business address. In the absence of a physical address 
for the establishment, the BR is populated with the firm’s business address. If the 
form is returned by the U.S. Postal Service as “undeliverable as addressed,” it is then 
re-mailed to the firm business address. More detailed information on the collection 
and processing of the MOPS is available in Buffington, Hennessy, and Ohlmacher 
(forthcoming). 
                                                 
 
10 This address may or may not be the physical location of the establishment.  It can be an 
administrative office, co-located with the plant or not. 
11 For respondents who prefer to answer surveys online, a letter is mailed to the enterprise address with 
login information. For multi-unit firms, the survey director at the firm distributes the login information 





An important feature of the MOPS is that it can be linked with little effort to 
Census Bureau data sets on plant-level outcomes. Since every establishment in the 
MOPS sample is also in the ASM sample, the results of MOPS can be linked with 
near certainty to annual performance data at the plant level, including outcomes on 
sales, shipments, payroll, employment, inventories, capital expenditure, and more for 
the corresponding ASM panel.12 Matching the MOPS to the Longitudinal Business 
Dataset (LBD) enables longitudinal research on establishment-level management 
practices and allows researchers to link MOPS data to numerous Census Bureau 
microdata sets, including the quinquennial Census of Manufactures, which is sent to 
all manufacturing establishments for years ending in ‘2’ or ‘7.’ 
Dissemination Strategy 
Raw data from the MOPS 2010 is available to qualified researchers on 
approved projects through the Federal Statistical Research Data Center (FSRDC) 
network. Once the MOPS 2015 collection is complete and the data has been 
processed, the raw data for the MOPS 2015 will also be available in the FSRDCs. For 
the MOPS 2015, the Census Bureau plans to release official tables using the data for 
management questions 1-16. Planned tables will provide aggregated results by 
subsector, state, plant employment size, and plant age, as well as question-level 
statistics. Statistics from MOPS 2010 were released via a press release and a detailed 
                                                 
 
12 The ASM sample is updated over the course of the sample period to reflect establishment openings 
and closures, and thus not all establishments will be matched to the ASM for all years between 2009 





working paper (Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster, Jarmin, Saporta-Eksten, and Van 
Reenen; 2013a). 
Researchers in the FSRDCs have begun utilizing the MOPS 2010 raw data. 
Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster, Jarmin, Patnaik, Saporta-Eksten, and Van Reenen 
(2016a) have explored possible drivers of differences in management within and 
across firms. Brynjolffson and McElheran (2016) show rapid adoption of data-driven 
decision-making practices between 2005 and 2010. Chapter 3 utilizes the MOPS 2010 
data to show that the relationship between within-plant changes in management 
practices and within-plant changes in productivity can largely be explained by 
demand-driven changes in bonus practices. 
Results of Collection in 2010 
MOPS 2010 received responses from approximately 37,000 establishments 
(about 78% of the establishments to whom the survey was successfully delivered), 
making it by far the largest panel of establishments surveyed about management 
practices to date.  For MOPS 2010, 58.4% of respondents answered the survey 
electronically and the remaining 41.6% returned a paper form. Establishments in the 
sample were mailed the MOPS form, instructions, and a cover letter in April 2011. 
After approximately two months, establishments that had received the package but 
not yet responded were again sent the form, instructions, and cover letter. Due to a 
processing error, some respondents received this follow-up despite having already 
responded. After approximately another month, a follow-up letter was sent to 
establishments who had not yet responded. A round of telephone follow-ups was 






The 2010 MOPS was developed using the WMS and existing Census Bureau 
collections as a starting point. In order to capture some of the dynamics of these core 
management practices, most questions on the MOPS  are asked with two points of 
reference; respondents are asked to report their responses for the past year (e.g., 2015) 
and to look backwards and respond for five years earlier (e.g., 2010). Chapter 3 
utilizes this recall data to examine how within-establishment reported changes in 
management practices co-vary with establishment-level changes in outcomes. 
The U.S. Census Bureau’s quality standards require that all data collection 
instruments must be tested and refined to ensure that the instrument can be 
understood and answered and does not cause undue burden for the respondents.13 One 
method of pre-testing a survey instrument is through expert review, which was 
conducted early in the development of the original MOPS survey and for its revised 
content. Another method of pre-testing is via cognitive interviews. Cognitive 
interviews are used to understand the respondents’ thought processes as they work 
through the instrument and to use that knowledge to improve the survey questions. 
The 2010 and 2015 MOPS survey instruments were tested and refined based on the 
results of cognitive interviews, as well as usability testing to ensure that the 
instrument was functional for respondents. Chapter 4 discusses this process in detail, 
                                                 
 






and provides context for how the testing procedure should influence researchers’ 
interpretation of the data. 
Measuring Management Practices 
The sixteen questions in the “Management Practices” section of the MOPS 
deal primarily with the structured management practices also covered by the WMS: 
namely, how activity is monitored, how targets for production and other monitored 
performance indicators are set, and how achievement of those targets is incentivized. 
The five monitoring questions concern the collection and use of information to 
monitor production. For example, how many key performance indicators were 
monitored at this establishment? The three targets questions concern the nature of 
targets and their integration. For example, who was aware of production targets at 
this establishment? The eight incentive questions concern whether personnel 
practices provide incentives to workers and managers. For example, when was an 
under-performing manager reassigned or dismissed?  The sixteen questions on 
management practices were unchanged between the 2010 and 2015 instruments to 
maximize comparability. These questions are the focus of the analysis in Chapter 3. 
Measuring Organization 
The original “Organization” section had thirteen questions that covered the 
level of decision making, span of control, and data and decision making. The five 
questions on the level of decision making concern whether resource (personnel and 
capital) and output (marketing, pricing) decisions are made at the establishment or 





made? Three questions concern the structure of the organization. For example, who 
prioritized or allocated tasks to production workers at this establishment? The three 
remaining questions include two questions about data and decision making and one 
question about sources of information about management practices. For example, 
what best describes the use of data to support decision making at this establishment? 
The “Organization” section was modified for the 2015 MOPS and now only includes 
seven questions. The three questions concerning organization were dropped due to 
low quality responses: respondents are no longer asked for the number of employees 
that report directly to the plant manager, the number of direct report layers at the 
establishment, or who allocates tasks to production workers. The two questions on 
data and decision making were moved to a new expanded section (described below) 
and the question about the sources of information about management practices was 
dropped. 
Measuring Background Characteristics 
The questions in the “Background Characteristics” section cover both the 
establishment and the respondent. There were 8 background questions in 2010. The 
five establishment questions covered the number of managers and employees, their 
college education, and the presence of a union. The two respondent questions asked 
for seniority and tenure. The final question is a certification question for the 
instrument.14 
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The MOPS 2015 includes a revised the background section, with two 
questions dropped and four questions added. These questions concerned the level of 
seniority of the respondent and the number of employees at the establishment (the 
latter is collected by the ASM).  The first two questions added to the MOPS 2015 
concern business strategies and production technologies. The second two additional 
questions concern the firm to which the establishment belongs. 
For MOPS 2015, respondents are asked about changes in usage of the labor 
force; respondents are asked to estimate shares of workers who worked part-time, 
shares of workers who worked flexible hours, shares of workers who worked from 
home one or more day per week, and shares of workers who were cross-trained. This 
question will enable researchers to study the complementarities between management 
practices and labor practices in the U.S. as Yang et al. (2015) find for Canadian firms. 
Structured management practices might be complementary to a more flexible 
labor force; alternatively, more structure on monitoring, targeting, and incentives may 
prevent such flexible arrangements from being made. Furthermore, these human 
resources practices are interesting in themselves for how they describe the 
relationship between employees and their workplaces. The 2015 MOPS will provide 
information on work-life balance that could be useful to both researchers and 
policymakers. 
Respondents are also asked whether their production process can be best 
described as “job shop,” “batch production,” “cellular manufacturing,” “continuous 
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flow (other than cellular manufacturing),” or “research & development or 
prototyping.” In contrast with the view of management taken by most of the empirical 
literature discussed above that more structured management practices can be 
institutional and make firms more productive, the organizational economics literature, 
including Gibbons and Henderson (2013) and Roberts and Saloner (2013), tends to 
emphasize management as a relational concept. That is, management practices must 
be tailored to the unique strategic and interpersonal needs of each establishment. 
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2016c) argue that empirical results on 
management practices are consistent with structured management practices being a 
technology that firms can adopt. Introducing this new question on production 
technologies will allow researchers to further test the “management as a technology” 
model of Bloom et al. (2016c) against the “management as design” hypothesis of 
Gibbons and Henderson (2013) and others. Although Bloom et al. (2013a) control for 
industry-level fixed effects in their research, type of production may not be perfectly 
correlated with industry, and may provide additional insight into the relationship 
between management practices and outcomes.  
Respondents are asked whether or not the firm is majority-owned by its 
founder(s) or members of a founder’s family, and if it is, whether or not a founder or 
a member of a founder’s family currently serves the firm as CEO. This will enable 
future research on primogeniture to compare with Bloom and Van Reenen (2007). 
The final additional question concerns whether the establishment is a part of a firm 
with production establishments in countries other than the United States. This enables 





useful variable for many of the projects undertaken within the Census Bureau and the 
network of FSRDCs, even those that are not specifically focused on management and 
organizational practices, expanding the value of the MOPS for the statistical 
community, policy makers, and academics. The organizational question on the 
location of the firm’s headquarters, which was present on MOPS 2010, has been 
enhanced to include a write-in box for the state or country in which the firm’s 
headquarters was located, which serves as a useful complement to this new question, 
as management and organizational practices may be country (or even state) 
dependent. 
Measuring Dynamics 
The addition of a second generation of the MOPS will introduce interesting 
dynamics between and across the two collections of the survey. Although the MOPS 
is a supplement to an annual survey (the ASM), a five year time interval between 
survey waves was selected for the MOPS since economic theory and anecdotal 
evidence suggest that it takes time for management practices to change. Bloom et al. 
(2016c) use their model of “management as a technology” to calculate the adjustment 
costs of management and find that management (as measured by the WMS) has a 
higher adjustment cost than capital. As a result of this higher adjustment cost and the 
assumption that management practices are irreversible, in the sense that management 
scores would only decline due to depreciation, their model produces smoother five-
year moments for growth in management scores than for capital growth. 
In the next chapter, I discuss changes in management practices between 2005 





distribution is consistent with the irreversibility story of Bloom et al. (2016c), select 
practices, namely incentives practices, are likely not irreversible. 
MOPS 2010 is the first survey of establishment-level management practices 
across time by virtue of including a retrospective component of nearly every question. 
The longitudinal component of MOPS 2010 relies solely on the recall of the 
respondent, asking the respondent about her establishment’s management practices in 
2005.15 As a result, there could be concerns about recall bias and therefore about the 
quality of the responses for 2005. Chapter 3 discusses the impact of recall bias in 
more detail. 
MOPS 2015 includes a similar recall component for 2010. By comparing the 
recall responses for 2010 on MOPS 2015 to the responses for 2010 from MOPS 2010, 
one can measure the quality of the responses to recall questions on structured 
management practices. It should be noted that the 2010 and 2015 MOPS were mailed 
to independent samples, so not all MOPS 2015 responses will be able to be matched 
to responses from the MOPS 2010. However, where such matches exist, the 
longitudinal benefit of reissuing the MOPS survey for 2015 extends beyond adding 
one additional time period to the data, and can assist in assessing the quality of 
existing data for 2005. 
As noted above, Bloom et al. (2013a) find the average management score for 
2010 is higher than the average reported score for 2005, with much of that growth 
coming from an increase in monitoring practices. This finding supports the work by 
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Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt (2002) and Aral, Brynjolfsson, and Wu (2012) that 
finds that IT adoption and structured management practices are complementary. 
Brynjolfsson and McElheran (2016) combine several management questions with the 
two data-driven decision-making questions on the MOPS 2010 and find that a 
measure of data-driven decision-making also increased between 2005 and 2010. The 
relationship between technology adoption and structured management practice 
adoption is fertile ground for future research that is only possible with the recall data 
and repeated collection of the MOPS. 
Furthermore, if structured management practices truly have a causal impact on 
establishment performance, a logical question is “How do establishments change their 
levels of implementation of structured management practices?” This is the central 
question addressed in Chapter 3. By adding an additional panel for 2015, MOPS 2015 
allows for increased study of the dynamics of management practices in U.S. 
manufacturing industries. Once the MOPS 2015 data becomes available to 
researchers, the exercises in Chapter 3 can be extended to include this additional 
panel. 
To this point, the existing surveys of management practices have lacked a 
strong longitudinal component. Although the WMS is long-running, each wave of the 
survey has focused on expanding the scope of the research across countries rather 
than across time. The WMS consists of five major waves in 2004, 2006, 2010, 2013, 
and 2014. All firms in the 2004 sample were re-contacted in 2006 in addition to firms 





firms from the 2006 sample, but without adding new firms to the sample. The 2014 
sample also re-contacted panel firms from 2013. (Bloom et al., 2016c)16 
It is important to note that because the WMS sample is generated at the firm-
level, the panels generally reflect the responses of different managers at possibly 
different establishments. The resampling of firms between 2006 and 2010 yielded a 
correlation between 2006 and 2010 management scores of 0.427, which could be a 
result of some combination of within-firm heterogeneity, changes in practices over 
time, and/or respondent bias. Additionally, the MOI deliberately resampled 404 firms 
(with possibly different plants and/or different respondents) from the WMS for the 
purpose of validating the MOI instrument and yielded a correlation between MOI and 
WMS management scores of 0.298 with two to three years having elapsed between 
the two interviews. (Bloom et al.; 2012c) 
MOPS 2010 is conducted at the establishment-level, and the sample includes 
establishments of multi-unit firms. Bloom et al. (2016a) find that half of the variation 
in management practices in the MOPS sample can be accounted for by differences in 
management practices across establishments within the same firm. In Chapter 3, I 
find that firm fixed effects account for about one third of plant-level changes in bonus 
practices between 2005 and 2010. The WMS did perform some internal validation by 
re-sampling 5% of each sample using a second interviewer to contact a second plant 
manager within the firm. This sample of 222 firms yielded a correlation between 
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management scores from the first and second interviews in the same year of 0.51. The 
difference is explained by some combination of within-firm heterogeneity and survey 
measurement error. (Bloom et al., 2016c) 
Data and Decision Making 
We start by providing motivation for the MOPS questions on data and 
decision making (two in 2010 and six in 2015) by reviewing the existing literature 
and research in this field. Part of the impetus for including management in theoretical 
economic models such as Radner (1992) or Adam (2007) is that managers may be 
essential for gathering and processing information. Indeed, two of the components of 
the structured management practices listed above, monitoring and targeting, can be 
described as a form of information processing. Management gathers information 
about production conditions both within and outside of the establishment (or firm) 
and then uses that information to set targets and make adjustments to the production 
process. The degree of data collection performed by firms is a key component of this 
relationship.  
The rise of information technologies (IT) has made it possible for 
establishments to utilize ever increasing amounts of data in their decision making, 
and Brynjolfsson and Mendelson (1993) argue that the increasing availability of data 
has necessitated the development and implementation of structured management 
practices. Much of the existing work in this field is focused on the implementation of 
information technologies. While IT and data and decision making (DDD) are clearly 





conceivably gather data for decision making without high levels of IT investment, 
while a firm that utilizes modern IT may not necessarily fully integrate DDD. 
Bresnahan et al. (2002) use a combination of a telephone survey of 379 firms, 
computer capital data from Computer Intelligence InfoCorp, and input and output 
data from Compustat.17 The telephone survey included 14 questions related to the 
organization of the firm’s workforce, which are neither fully orthogonal to nor 
entirely consistent with the definition of structured management practices given 
above. The survey measures uses of teams, dispersion of authority, and education. 
The authors find that IT implementation and workplace reorganizations focused on 
teamwork and individual authority are both positively correlated with productivity 
and have complementary effects when implemented together. Similarly, Aral et al. 
(2012) find high levels of complementarities between IT implementation, 
implementation of performance pay, and human resource management practices that 
monitor performance and give employee feedback. Taken together, these three 
practices have a large positive impact on worker productivity in the 189 firms 
surveyed by a non-profit organization that educates firms on human resource 
practices that also purchased an IT system called Human Capital Management. 
 Bloom, Garicano, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2009) combine the WMS with a 
private software utilization data source called Harte-Hanks. They find that increased 
implementation of information technology leads to more decentralization in 
                                                 
 





manufacturing firms, while implementation of communication technology leads to 
greater centralization. 
 The Census Bureau collected the Computer Network Use Supplement 
(CNUS) to the ASM sample in 1999. Like the MOPS, this data could be readily 
matched to high quality performance data from the ASM. Atrostic and Nguyen 
(2005) find that establishments that have computer networks have higher labor 
productivity than establishments that do not have computer networks. They find that 
moving from the 10th to the 90th percentile of computer network use was associated 
with a 7.2% increase in labor productivity, as well as evidence that establishments 
with low labor productivity in earlier periods use the introduction of computer 
networks to “catch up” with establishments that are more productive. Additionally, 
the use of networks in 1999 was more likely for establishments of multi-unit firms 
than for single units. 
Results on DDD are similar to those on structured management practices. 
Using a survey conducted on 330 large, publicly traded firms in 2008, Brynjolfsson, 
Hitt, and Kim (2011) find that output and productivity are higher for firms that 
depend on data to make decisions than for other firms with similar levels of 
investment and IT usage. Using an instrumental variable method, they find that it 
seems likely that utilization of DDD leads to higher productivity, rather than it being 
the case that more productive firms are simply more able to then implement DDD. 
Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2012a) use a modified version of the WMS 
survey instrument’s questions on personnel management, as well as a private IT 





personnel management practices are positively correlated with IT investment and 
productivity. They find that U.S. multinationals achieve higher productivity from IT 
investment than do non-U.S. multinationals or non-U.S. companies broadly. The 
difference in IT productivity is attributed to complementary investment in personnel 
management practices in U.S. multinationals. Bartel et al. (2007) also find that 
investment in IT is accompanied by changes in personnel management practices in 
the valve production industry. 
 As noted above, the MOPS 2010 included two questions in “Organization” 
that touched upon DDD; MOPS 2015 moves these two questions to the start of the 
new “Data and Decision Making” component of the survey.18 In effect, this does not 
affect the order of the questions, but only inserts a header above these two questions, 
and so the comparability of the 2010 and 2015 collections should not be adversely 
impacted due to question order bias. The two existing questions ask if data is 
available to establishments and if it is being used to make decisions when available, 
similar to the questions asked by Brynjolfsson et al. (2011).  
Using the questions from the management section of the MOPS 2010, Bloom 
et al. (2013a) find that respondents report significant growth in data-driven 
monitoring practices between 2005 and 2010, which is a significant driver in overall 
improvement of management practices over that period, but they do not link this 
result to the two DDD questions. Brynjolfsson and McElheran (2016) use an index 
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constructed from the monitoring questions and the two DDD questions on the 2010 
MOPS to find that larger, older plants of multi-unit firms adopt DDD earlier and to a 
larger extent than smaller, single-unit firms. However, the single-unit firms exhibit a 
higher correlation between DDD and performance than multi-unit firms do. 
 There are four new DDD questions on MOPS 2015. First, establishments are 
asked who chose what data was collected by the establishment. Second, respondents 
are asked to gauge how frequently four key data sources are used in the decision 
making process. The data sources referenced are production performance indicators 
from production technology or instruments, formal or informal feedback from 
managers, formal or informal feedback from non-managers, and outside data, which 
includes data from suppliers, customers, and/or outside data providers such as Federal 
statistical indicators.  Third, MOPS 2015 also collects data on what types of 
decisions, namely new product design, demand forecasting, and supply chain 
management, are driven by data analysis and how frequently those decisions refer 
back to data. Fourth, respondents are asked about the reliance on predictive analytics. 
As noted previously, two important components of structured management 
practices are targeting and monitoring. Monitoring is inherently coincidental, but 
targeting is a forward-looking process. The DDD section will include a fourth new 
question on the frequency with which decisions are made using predictive analytics 
such as statistical models of demand or production. This will enhance the ability of 
researchers to study the sophistication of the management practices being 





DDD and management practices with the study of uncertainty, the second new 
section of questions in MOPS 2015, which we turn to next. 
Uncertainty 
The final new section of the MOPS concerns uncertainty. Here we give some 
background that led to the eight questions in the 2015 MOPS.  Like management, 
“uncertainty” has long been a useful explanation for economic outcomes in the 
popular press, policymaking, and theoretical models. Knight (1921) defined 
uncertainty as the inability of a person to make a forecast about an upcoming event. 
In contrast to risk, where a person has some knowledge of an underlying probability 
distribution, uncertainty comes about when it is reasonably difficult to get a sense of 
the probability of outcomes, or even the entire outcome space. Because this definition 
of uncertainty involves unknown probabilities and outcomes, measuring the degree of 
uncertainty in the economy involves measuring the degree to which individuals are 
aware of unknown probability distributions. 
 This difficulty associated with measuring uncertainty has not stopped 
uncertainty from long being used as an explanation for economic outcomes. Bloom 
(2014) presents several key examples of the popular press suggesting that uncertainty 
over policy and growth has hindered investment and employment growth.  For 
example, the Federal Open Market Committee attributed a slowdown in investment to 
firms’ uncertainty about economic prospects in 2008, and the Chief Economist of the 
IMF Olivier Blanchard and then-Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors 
Christina Romer both cited uncertainty as a factor driving a reduction in demand in 





reduction in economic activity through several channels, including increasing risk 
premia (for example, Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2010)) and precautionary savings 
(Bansel and Yaron, 2004). 
 Bloom (2014) examines many of the common measures of uncertainty, which 
include stock market volatility, GDP volatility, variation between consensus estimates 
and realized values of economic indicators, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia’s Survey of Professional Forecasters, and the number of appearances of 
the word “uncertainty” in newspaper articles or the Federal Reserve’s Beige Book. A 
research team including Scott Baker, Nick Bloom, and Steven Davis compiles indices 
of policy uncertainty generated from newspaper articles for the U.S., Europe, Canada, 
China, India, Japan, and Russia at www.policyuncertainty.com. Their index for the 
U.S. also includes data on expiring tax code provisions and disagreement between 
professional forecasters (drawn from the Survey of Professional Forecasters). 
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2013, 2015b) and Baker, Bloom, Canes-Wrone, 
Davis, and Rodden (2015a) examine the measurement of policy uncertainty, its role 
in stock market fluctuations, and its potential sources, respectively. However, Jurado, 
Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) note that the use of proxies to measure uncertainty may be 
useful only under a limited set of circumstances. For instance, they note that “stock 
market volatility can change over time even if there is no change in uncertainty about 
economic fundamentals, if leverage changes, or if movements in risk aversion or 
sentiment are important drivers of asset market fluctuations.” (Jurado, Ludvigson, and 





Monte Carlo methods to generate a measure of uncertainty from a time series 
consisting of 132 mostly macroeconomic variables and 147 financial variables. 
The aforementioned proxies of policy uncertainty have been widely used in 
finance, and have been presented in congressional and Federal Reserve testimony.19  
Bloom (2009) uses stock market volatility to show that bad news uncertainty shocks 
are associated with reductions in hiring and investment. Similarly, Bloom, Bond, and 
Van Reenen (2007) use deviations in stock returns to show that uncertainty reduces 
investment. If one takes the view, as in Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2016) that 
management is a technology, then adoption of management practices can be viewed 
as a form of investment. However, the relationship between uncertainty and adoption 
of structured management practices has been largely untested to this point. 
 Several surveys by central banks take the approach of directly asking 
households and businesses for their expectations over various economic outcomes. 
The Bank of Japan’s TANKAN is sent out to 210,000 large firms quarterly and can 
be answered by mail or online.20 Firms are asked to judge their views of business 
conditions, inventories, capacity, employment, finances, and other topics at the 
present, and then asked to give annual projections on sales, exports, exchange rates, 
profits, income, investment, and inflation. Similarly, The Bank of Italy’s Survey on 
Inflation and Growth Expectations is issued annually and manufacturing firms are 
                                                 
 
19 For a list of applications of this data, visit www.policyuncertainty.com/research.html. 





asked about investment levels for the current year, which includes a partial forecast.21 
D’Aurizio and Iezzi (2010) use these qualitative responses to build a forecasting 
model of investment. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia also runs a monthly 
Business Outlook Survey (BOS) in which 100-125 manufacturing firms are asked 
only if certain economic indicators (orders, shipments, prices, employees, etc.) are 
expected to increase, decrease, or remain unchanged within the next six months.22 
Variation in these forecasts can be used to construct measures of uncertainty. 
The Ifo Institute Center for Economic Studies in Munich has run the Ifo 
Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS) that surveys between 2,500 and 5,000 German 
products (which cover 2,000-4,000 continuing firms) on a monthly basis with 
consistent data running back to 1980. Respondents are asked to characterize their 
expectations of business conditions as “more favorable,” “unchanged,” or “more 
unfavorable.”23 Bachmann, Elstner, and Sims (2013) use both the BOS and IFO-BCS 
to show that adverse supply shocks tend to increase uncertainty, but uncertainty in the 
absence of shocks has only limited adverse effects on real activity. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, in partnership with Steven Davis of the 
University of Chicago Booth School of Business and Nicholas Bloom of Stanford 
University, has created the Decision Maker Survey to measure firms' year-ahead 
                                                 
 
21 For more information on the Survey on Inflation and Growth Expectations, visit 
www.bancaditalia.it/statistiche/tematiche/indagini-famiglie-imprese/aspettative-inflazione/index.html. 
22 For more information on the BOS, visit www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/regional-
economy/business-outlook-survey/ 






expectations and associated uncertainties regarding changes in their costs, prices, 
profit margins, level of employment, capital investment, and sales revenue. The 
survey panel consists of a national sample of firms representing every sector of the 
economy (with the exception of agriculture and government) and a broad range of 
firm sizes. In addition, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta runs the Business 
Inflation Expectations survey, which asks 300 firms monthly to assign probabilities to 
six potential outcomes for inflation over the next twelve months,24 and asks a pair of 
questions on its biannual Small Business Survey (SBS) on uncertainty. The SBS 
covers firms with fewer than 500 employees and asks respondents whether 
“uncertainty” as a broad concept is having a larger or smaller impact on the firm’s 
decision making relative to six months prior, and then asks respondents to cite the 
primary source of uncertainty.25 
 The link between management and uncertainty is discussed in some of the 
theoretical literature, including Adam (2007) which uses management as a motivator 
for limited capacity for information processing. If managers are responsible for 
gathering and processing information and setting targets, then managers are 
responsible, in some sense, for monitoring uncertainty. Do better management 
practices and more data-driven decision making lead to better forecasts and reduced 
uncertainty? Does the presence of uncertainty increase investment in management 
because of this effect? Or does uncertainty reduce investment in management 
                                                 
 
24 For more information on the Business Inflation Expectations survey, visit 
www.frbatlanta.org/research/inflationproject/bie.aspx 





practices due to precautionary savings on the part of the establishment? Limited 
research exists to this point on the role of management in the quality of forecasts, but 
Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2013) find that executives are often incorrect with 
regards to their forecasts of stock market distributions. 
 MOPS 2015 includes eight new questions on uncertainty. There are two 
uncertainty questions on each of the following four subjects: shipments, capital 
expenditure, employment, and the cost of materials, parts, containers, and packaging. 
The first question for each subject asks for an estimate of the value of the variable in 
question in 2015 as well as a partial forecast of 2016, which will be roughly one-third 
complete at the time that respondents receive the survey. The latter portion of these 
questions is in the vein of the Italian Survey on Inflation and Growth Expectations, 
while the former allows for a measure of the measurement error of the respondents 
relative to the ASM.26  
The second question asks respondents for five points of their possible 
distribution of possible outcomes at the plant for 2017 (lowest, low, middle, high, and 
highest) and the likelihood that they would assign to each outcome. Taken together 
these questions can be used to estimate the moments of the distributions of the 
variables in question, which provides a much richer measure of uncertainty than the 
proxies outlined above.27 Because this set of questions is somewhat abstract, the 
                                                 
 
26 Note that the questions on employment ask for employment as of March 12 for consistency with the 
ASM. Since MOPS 2015 was in 2016, the question on employment in 2015 and 2016 will not include 
a forecasting component. 
27 The Census Bureau’s annual Business R&D and Innovation Survey (BRDIS) asks respondents for 
firm-level forecasts of R&D expenditure for the year following the coverage year (which is the year in 





section is preceded by instructions with an example of how a hypothetical respondent 
might fill out a pair of uncertainty questions. 
Conclusions 
  Management has long been used as a residual in the explanation of why 
performance differs across firms and establishments. While business schools and the 
popular press have emphasized the importance of particular management practices, 
only in the last ten years have economists devoted significant empirical study to 
management practices. As the largest single study of management practices and the 
first large-scale study of management in the United States, the MOPS is at the center 
of this burgeoning field of research. 
The research team (external researchers and Census researchers) published the 
first detailed results of the MOPS 2010 data in a CES working paper.28 Bloom, et al. 
(2013a) report findings that are consistent with the earlier work from the WMS. Firms 
that adopt more of the structured management practices related to monitoring, 
targeting, and incentives are more productive, more profitable, and grow faster than 
firms with lower levels of structured management practice adoption. They also find 
that there are high levels of dispersion in structured management practice adoption, 
with higher levels of adoption being found in the South and Midwest, in larger 
                                                 
 
foreign and domestic R&D expenditure and the amount of R&D expenditure paid for by others. More 
information on the BRDIS can be found on the Census Bureau’s informational webpage: 
http://www.census.gov/manufacturing/brdis/ 






establishments, in establishments of large firms, in exporting establishments, and in 
establishments with more educated employees. Finally, the authors find that 
establishments generally report higher levels of implementation of structured 
management practices in 2010 than in 2005.  
An updated version working paper was issued also including preliminary 
results involving investment in IT. Bloom, Brynjolfsson, Foster, Jarmin, Patnaik, 
Saporta-Eksten, and Van Reenen (2014a) utilize the linkages between MOPS and 
ASM performance data, as well as capital stock data from the Census of 
Manufacturers and link to Compustat data. They find that firms with higher 
management scores generally have higher rates of innovation, invest more heavily in 
IT, and have higher stock market valuations. 
The second collection of the MOPS will enable us to better understand the 
dynamics of management practices. Moreover, the expanded version of the MOPS 
includes questions on two new subjects related to management: data and decision 
making and uncertainty. Because management is concerned at least in part with 
monitoring and setting forecasts, data collection and usage is an important 
complement to structured management practices. Furthermore, since targeting is at 
least in part forward-looking, structured management practices must also be related to 
the study of uncertainty.  With its sixteen new questions (four on background, four on 
DDD, and eight on uncertainty), it will be exciting to see how the MOPS 2015 adds 
to our understanding of management practices in the U.S. 
In the next chapter, I analyze results from the MOPS 2010 to examine the role 





Table 2.1: Management Surveys in the United States 




















Establishment 3100 All establishments 














School 279 Education 
Self-Administered 
Survey 
Bartel et al. 
(2013) 
Establishment 212 Valve-making plants 





























Cardiac unit 597 Healthcare 
 
                                                 
 
29 Although the WMS is conducted at the establishment level, analysis can only be conducted at the 
firm level due to the reliance on public data for performance. This note applies to other surveys that 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 







































































































































































Chapter 3: Incentives Practices, Productivity, and the Great 
Recession 
Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapter, interest in management practices as a 
possible driver of dispersion in firm performance dates back at least 130 years. 
Nevertheless, many recent empirical studies for the United States have not focused on 
the causality of the relationship between performance and management. 
Although recent papers about the use of structured management practices in 
developing countries by Karlan et al. (2012), McKenzie and Woodruff (2012), and 
Bloom et al. (2013b) have provided at least some evidence for a causal relationship 
between these practices and firm performance, it is not clear whether or not findings 
for developing countries generalize to the U.S. For instance, the practices suggested 
to the textile firms in Bloom et al. (2013b) included organizing inventory and 
protecting it from water damage, clearing inventory from the shop floor, and 
removing broken machinery. It is possible that many of the gains associated with such 
behaviors have already been realized in developed countries where there are prolific 
business education programs and consulting industries devoted to management. 
The MOPS dataset described in the preceding chapter provides an opportunity 
not only to study the relationship between management practices and traditional 
measures of firm performance, but also to link results on management practices to 
Census Bureau data sets that span topics as wide-ranging as international trade, firm 
balance sheets, and firm dynamics. As noted above, the initial results of the survey 





of structured management practices across U.S. manufacturing plants and that 
adoption of these practices is positively correlated with labor productivity. 
Bloom et al. (2013a) perform a simple first-differences regression as part of 
their analysis, but this chapter is the first work to perform an in-depth study of the 
behavior of management practices within establishments over time. I find that the 
distribution of changes in management practices is positively skewed but displays 
high levels of net inaction, with some establishments reducing their implementation 
of structured management practices. The positive skewness is driven by increases in 
scores on questions related to data-driven performance monitoring, but many 
establishments became less likely to award monetary performance incentives over the 
period of observation, which covers the Great Recession. 
This chapter is also the first work to closely examine the multidimensional 
nature of structured management practices. While the pioneering work in this 
literature developed a single index to assess the structure of management practices, 
this chapter examines how the related practices that comprise the index co-vary 
differently with outcomes. After controlling for local labor market effects, changes in 
labor productivity and total factor productivity (TFP) within establishments from 
2005 to 2010 are positively correlated with changes in the actual administration of 
performance bonuses, but not with most other types of structured management 
practices. Performance bonus practices and data-driven performance monitoring 
practices both have positive relationships with employment growth, although the 
magnitude of the relationship between bonus practices and employment growth 





employment growth. Variable selection techniques such as principal component 
analysis and double Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator regression 
support decomposing the index of structured management practices in this way. 
The fact that the Great Recession falls between 2005 and 2010 suggests that 
establishing a causal relationship between management practices and productivity at 
manufacturing establishments in the United States may not be as straightforward as 
suggested by Bloom et al. (2013b). Negative demand shocks likely reduced both 
measured productivity and the availability of bonuses. This raises a new series of 
questions: Is the correlation between within-establishment changes in bonuses and 
within-establishment changes in measured revenue productivity merely a mechanical 
reflection of demand shocks that affect both simultaneously? If not, do reductions in 
bonus practices in response to shocks have a causal impact on productivity that 
causes them to serve as an amplification mechanism for negative demand shocks? 
I show that the demand-driven component of bonuses is large and positively 
correlated with measured labor productivity. I use information from the MOPS 
pretesting program, described in Chapter 4, to show that unionization before the Great 
Recession is a strong predictor of later bonus practices. The component of bonus 
practices explained by pre-recession unionization is not correlated with plant 
performance, which is suggestive that there is not a causal link between the 
availability of bonuses and performance over this period. 
Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that decision-making involving 
bonus practices is made at the firm level for multi-unit firms. I find evidence that 





control for demand, which would support the hypothesis that reductions in bonuses 
serve as an amplification mechanism for negative demand shocks. 
This chapter proceeds as follows: the next section discusses related literature. 
Subsequently, I detail empirical evidence on the adjustment of management practices 
from the MOPS. Two sections follow containing analysis of the relationship between 
changes in management practices and productivity. The first establishes that the 
relationship between management practices and plant outcomes is largely attributable 
to responses to questions related to bonus practices, while the second addresses the 
causal link between bonus practices and productivity shocks, finding limited evidence 
that increasing the availability of bonuses between 2005 and 2010 had a positive 
causal impact on outcomes. The final section of this chapter concludes. 
Related Literature 
As discussed in Chapter 2, over the last ten years, there has been a revolution 
in the measurement of management practices for empirical economics research. The 
WMS, the first large and consistent study of management practices, and its successor, 
the MOPS, have enabled new empirical research on structured management practices 
related to monitoring, targeting, and incentives. Research using these data or related 
data produced using similar methodologies has shown that establishments that adopt 
these structured practices are more productive, more profitable, and grow faster than 
establishments that adopt fewer structured management practices. 
While structured management practices are positively correlated with several 
measures of firm performance, this correlation does not necessarily establish a causal 





management practices leads to higher productivity, profitability, size, and/or 
survivorship; for instance, it is possible that tighter monitoring and performance 
incentives lead to less shirking and thus higher labor productivity. However, it is also 
possible that large, productive firms have more structured organizational practices 
simply as a function of being large firms. For example, large firms may monitor more 
performance data mechanically as a function of having more data to monitor. 
Bloom et al. (2016a) identify four possible drivers of the adoption of 
structured management practices in the MOPS data: product market competition, 
state business policies, learning spillovers, and human capital. Using exchange rate 
shocks and a Lerner index, “Right to Work” laws, location of “Million Dollar Plant” 
openings, and location of land grant colleges to proxy for each of these plausibly 
exogenous factors, respectively, they find that these factors can account for 
approximately one third of the variation in the adoption of structured management 
practices at the plant level. Most relevant for this paper, they find that “Right to 
Work” laws affect the adoption of practices related to promotion and dismissal, but 
not other management practices. Bloom et al. (2016a) do not address the question of 
whether or not management practice adoption is causally linked to plant-level 
outcomes such as productivity and employment. 
As noted in Chapter 2, Bloom et al. (2013b) attempt to establish a causal link 
between management practices and performance by running an experiment on 17 
large Indian textile firms. They offer management consulting to a subset of the 
sample establishments, and find that treated establishments see marked improvement 





consulting period, and are more likely to expand in subsequent months than control 
firms. Furthermore, they find that treated firms more than recoup the costs of 
implementation of these management practices within one year. 
The results from Bloom et al. (2013b) raise questions related to extendibility. 
Is this causal relationship present in firms in other countries and/or industries, 
including United States manufacturing firms? Examples of practices introduced in the 
treatment include moving broken equipment and organizing inventory stocks, while 
the MOPS focuses more on abstract practices such as monitoring key performance 
indicators (KPIs) and providing performance bonuses. It is conceivable that adopting 
the former set of practices does causally increase productivity, yet implementing the 
latter set of practices in a more developed country will not increase establishment-
level productivity. 
This paper decomposes structured management practices into component 
subsets, and finds that much of the relationship between structured management 
practices and productivity is accounted for by incentives practices, particularly bonus 
practices. As such, this paper is related to the large labor economics literature on 
incentive-based pay schemes. Black and Lynch (2001) used an earlier Census Bureau 
dataset, the National Employer Survey (NES), to examine the impact of human 
resource management systems and “Total Quality Management” (TQM) practices on 
firm performance. They find that adopting TQM systems is not effective in increasing 
productivity, whereas decentralizing decision-making and introducing incentive-






Because of its focus on the role played by bonus practices, this paper also is 
linked to the personnel economics literature on incentives. This literature consists of 
theoretical studies of incentives design to minimize moral hazard and encourage 
employee effort, as well as empirical studies of how employees respond to incentives. 
Lazear (2000) uses data from the Safelite Glass Company to show that when the 
company switched from hourly wages to piece rates for windshield installation, 
productivity increased by approximately 44%. About half of this increase can be 
explained by increased effort, while the other half is due to self-selection of more 
productive workers into Safelite. Other studies show similar results.31 
There is also a sizeable literature in labor economics on executive pay and 
compensation. The theoretical strand of this literature examines incentive designs to 
reduce the impact of the principal-agent problem, while the empirical side examines 
the relationship between incentive-based pay schemes and firm outcomes.32 The 
outcome of interest in this literature is primarily shareholder value, although Tello-
Trillo (2015) finds that between 5% and 8% of productivity growth between 1993 and 
1998 is due to increased managerial incentives induced by reduced trade costs. 
While this paper deals with the impact of incentive-based pay schemes on 
productivity, it is both more general and more limited than the existing personnel 
economics literature. The incentives practices surveyed by the MOPS are not defined 
as specifically as those in the existing personnel economics literature, but the 
                                                 
 
31 See Lazear and Oyer (2013) for a summary of empirical work on incentives. 





resulting dataset is larger than much of this related work. Most of the existing work 
has dealt with single firms implementing piece-rate pay schemes for production 
workers or on the role of executive compensation, while this paper is the first to 
examine the impact of general performance-based incentive pay on productivity in 
manufacturing across the United States. 
Bonus payments are a less explicit form of incentive than piece-rate pay. 
Parent (1999) notes that 
Piece rate or commission contracts are explicit in nature: one gets paid a 
certain contractually specified amount per unit produced. Bonuses can be 
explicit as well, such as when workers get rewarded for achieving or 
surpassing a sales target. But employers can also award bonuses on a more 
discretionary basis. 
That discretion makes detangling the causal relationship between bonus pay and 
productivity of particular interest. Because of discretion in awarding bonuses, 
bonuses can be adjusted in response to economic conditions, making bonuses a 
potential source of wage flexibility. 
Thus, this paper is also related to the large literature on downward wage 
rigidity, particularly in the Great Recession. Elsby, Shin, and Solon (2013) and 
Fallick, Lettau, and Wascher (2016) find evidence of downward nominal wage 
rigidity during the Great Recession. The former also find that there is substantial 
downward wage flexibility reported in employee data, while the latter perform several 
tests of downward nominal wage rigidity using employer data and find evidence that 





The findings of this paper reflect its aggregate focus. While I find that bonus 
pay reacts to aggregate shocks which also impact measured productivity, this does not 
invalidate previous studies finding that performance incentives can increase 
productivity. Instead, it suggests that during the Great Recession establishments may 
not have implemented incentive schemes in a way that was immediately productivity-
enhancing. 
Data 
This paper deals primarily with data from the first 16 questions in the MOPS 
survey, which cover management practices, as discussed in Chapter 2. These 
questions form three major categories – monitoring (6 questions), targeting (2 
questions), and incentives (8 questions). The monitoring questions deal primarily with 
the quantity of KPIs and the frequency with which those indicators are reviewed by 
managers and non-managers. Targeting questions have to do with the scope and 
achievability of production targets. Incentives practices fall into three subcategories: 
questions related to the basis for and availability of bonuses, questions related to the 
basis of promotions, and questions related to the speed at which underperforming 
workers are reassigned or dismissed. Together these questions give a sense of the 
structure of management practices at the establishment. Respondents are asked to 
complete each of these questions for the main survey reference year of 2010, and to 
provide retrospective information for 2005. This recall data enables me to examine 
the impact of reported changes in management practices on productivity. 
Naturally, there is some concern that recall bias will color the results of this 





play a significant role in survey data. The MOPS features one question that overlaps 
with its sister survey, the ASM: respondents are asked to report the number of 
employees on their payroll for the pay periods including March 12, 2005 and March 
12, 2010. To control for the effects of recall bias, I drop responses whose reported 
2005 employment differs from their employment reported on the 2005 ASM by more 
than 33%.33 
I also hypothesize that the estimates in this chapter are more likely to 
understate the positive correlation between changes in bonus practices and changes in 
productivity than to overstate it. Respondents are biased to report increases in 
structured management practices between 2005 and 2010. However, I show that the 
relationship between management and productivity over this time period are largely 
driven by respondents who report decreases in the structure of their bonus practices 
between 2005 and 2010 and who exhibit decreasing productivity over the period. 
Respondents biases may cause them to underreport these decreases in structure, 
biasing the coefficients between bonuses and productivity towards zero. On the other 
hand, if respondents remember changes in bonuses more accurately than other 
practice changes, these results may overstate the relative importance of bonuses. 
For each of the 16 management questions on the MOPS, responses are ranked 
from zero to one, with one corresponding to the most structured practice and zero 
corresponding to the least structured practice. Scores are then assigned to the 
remaining responses so that each response is uniformly distant from the next highest 
                                                 
 





response to the question.34 See Table 3.17 for the scoring of each of the 16 
management questions and responses. An index is then created based on a simple 
average of these responses. This yields a single structured management score between 
zero and one, with a score of one indicating implementation of all of the most 
structured practices and zero being the implementation of the least structured 
practices. This methodology follows Bloom et al. (2013a) for comparability. As in 
Bloom et al. (2013a), respondents are required to have answered at least 11 of the 
sixteen management questions for each year.35 Since this paper is interested in the 
role that different types of management practices play in establishment-level 
productivity, the sample is restricted to respondents that answered at least one 
question of each type (monitoring, targeting, bonuses, promotions, and 
reassignment/dismissal) in each year. 
The MOPS survey was mailed to all establishments in the 2015 ASM mail 
sample, and received about 37,000 responses. Because this paper focuses on within-
establishment changes in management practices, the sample is restricted to 
establishments that were active in 2005 and for which respondents provided data 
about the establishment’s practices in both 2005 and 2010. This requirement biases 
the sample by excluding plants that were active in 2005, but closed prior to 2010, as 
                                                 
 
34 For example, a question having five possible responses would have scores of 0, ¼, ½, ¾, and 1 
allocated among the responses. 
35 To ensure that respondents with the least structured practices are included in the sample, I impute 
responses for questions that were left blank due to skip patterns on the form. If a question is answered 
in a way that would generate the skip pattern, responses for the skipped questions are set to zero. 
Bloom et al. (2013a) do not adjust for non-response due to survey skip patterns. The results of this 





well as by failing to account for establishments that are less than five years old. 
Furthermore, only establishments with data on revenue total factor productivity 
(RTFP), as well as positive employment, real value added, and imputed capital stock 
from the ASM are included in the sample. 
RTFP is measured using a gross output measure constructed by the 
Collaborative Micro-Productivity Project (CMP), a joint project from the Census 
Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The measures of capital stock and output 
used for this paper are also drawn from the CMP dataset. The CMP dataset is 
constructed following the methodology described in Foster, Haltiwanger, and Grim 
(2014). Finally, only establishments that are also included in the Longitudinal 
Business Database (LBD) are included in the baseline sample. 
Because the ASM is resampled every five years, two years after the preceding 
Economic Census years, the samples for the 2005 and 2010 ASMs are not identical. 
Since larger establishments (based on employment, cost of fuel, cost of electricity, 
and inventories) are sampled with certainty in each ASM sample, this biases the 
sample toward larger establishments.36 
The primary sample for this paper consists of approximately 12,000 
establishments. Descriptive statistics for this sample can be found in the data 
appendix at the end of this chapter. Table 3.17 gives descriptive statistics for the size, 
age, and productivity of the establishments in the sample. The mean establishment in 
                                                 
 
36 See “How the Data are Collected” on the Census Bureau’s ASM website for more information on 






this sample had about 236 employees in 2010 and was about 27 years old.37 The 
mean establishment was slightly larger in 2005 in terms of employment, which is to 
be expected due to the Great Recession. 
Figure 3.1 shows Kernel Density Estimations for the distributions of 
structured management practice scores at the establishments in the sample for 2005 
and 2010. In both years, there is significant dispersion in management scores, with 
negative skew. The mean reported management score increased slightly from 2005 to 
2010, from 0.56 to 0.65, with the variance of responses decreasing slightly over the 
same period. The negative skew is larger in 2010 than in 2005. 
Figure 3.2 illustrates the percentage change in management score within 
establishments from 2005 to 2010. While there is a high level of net inactivity, in 
which establishments’ overall management score does not change from 2005 to 2010, 
the distribution exhibits strong positive skewness, with many establishments having a 
net increase in their management score over the period. The average establishment 
increased its management score approximately 16% between 2005 and 2010. Figure 
3.3 decomposes these changes into the three main subcategories of questions: 
monitoring, targeting, and incentives. The distribution of percentage changes in the 
monitoring score also displays high levels of net inactivity, but the mean percentage 
change is higher than for the other categories at approximately 28%. The distributions 
of changes in targeting and incentive scores are somewhat more symmetric, with 
                                                 
 
37 For reference, in the larger MOPS sample used in Bloom et al. (2013a), which does not require that 
establishments have data for 2005 on the MOPS or the ASM, the mean establishment had 167 






lower mean changes of 14% and 8%, respectively, but still display high levels of net 
inactivity and positive skewness. 
Decomposing incentive practices further into subcategories of questions 
related to bonus availability and time to reassign/dismiss workers (ignoring questions 
about the basis of promotions) yields the result that the positive skewness in the 
incentives distribution is driven almost entirely by changes in reassignment/dismissal 
practices. That is, many establishments report that the time taken to dismiss an 
underperforming worker was less in 2010 than it was in 2005. In fact, there is a 
sizeable density at a 200% increase in the structure of reassignment/dismissal 
practices, which consists of those respondents who report that they did not reassign or 
dismiss underperforming workers in 2005, but reassigned or dismissed 
underperformers in less than six months in 2010.38 This change may be due in part to 
changing economic conditions, rather than the implementation of more structured 
practices. 
Bonus practices, on the other hand, have a relatively symmetric distribution, 
with high net inactivity. The distribution of changes in bonus practices has a 
fundamentally different shape relative to distributions of changes in other types of 
management practices, which all exhibit varying degrees of positive skewness. This 
difference is likely due to the fact that bonus practices may be procyclical. That is, the 
ability of a plant to pay bonuses is constrained by the financial performance of the 
                                                 
 
38 In fact, this tail density at 200% is under-reported to ensure that no confidential data is disclosed. 
Note that the responses to questions 15 and 16 do not include an option for “no underperforming non-





plant. While the questions on the MOPS are designed to ask the respondent about her 
plant’s hypothetical ceteris paribus bonus practices, linguistically and cognitively this 
may not have been realized. In the subsequent sections, I examine the particular role 
bonus practices play in the relationship between firm performance and structured 
management practices. 
In this chapter, I examine an additional subset of the data in order to isolate 
the causal relationship between bonus practices and productivity. To study this effect, 
I first show that bonus decisions are made largely at the firm level, particularly when 
compared to decisions related to other management practices. Thus, I consider the 
subset of approximately 6,800 establishments in the baseline sample which are part of 
a multi-unit firm, have at least one sibling establishment in the baseline sample, and 
have at least one sibling establishment in the baseline sample whose MOPS data was 
filled out by a different individual. The third criterion ensures that when analyzing the 
locus of decision-making regarding bonuses, I am not incorrectly assessing 
respondent fixed effects. 
Identification Challenges 
Identifying a causal relationship between management practices and plant-
level outcomes is complicated by certain features of the data. First, both of the 
measures of productivity used in this paper, labor productivity and total factor 
productivity, are revenue-based measures. Thus, changes in these measures 
incorporate changes in mark-ups (prices), which may be affected by demand shocks 
that also affect the plant’s ability to pay bonuses. Furthermore, even if the 





measured physical productivity may reflect changes in demand, which may also be 
correlated with changes in bonuses. 
To address these challenges, I use instrumental variable methods to show that 
the demand-driven component of changes in bonuses is strongly positively correlated 
with changes in labor productivity, while there is limited evidence that bonus changes 
for other reasons are positively correlated with labor productivity. I use three different 
instruments for bonus changes at the plant level. The first is a measure of local 
demand based on Bartik (1991). The construction of this measure is discussed at 
length in the Data Appendix section of this chapter. The measure utilizes changes in 
employment at all manufacturing establishments in the LBD from 2005 to 2010. 
I also utilize a question from the “Background Characteristics” section of the 
MOPS on the share of unionized workers at the establishment in 2005 as an 
instrument for changes in bonus practices. Bloom et al. (2016a) show that “Right-to-
Work” status, which is a proxy for the state business environment including reduced 
influence of labor unions, is strongly positively correlated with increased structure in 
incentives practices related to promotions and reassignment and dismissal. 
Interestingly, they do not find that “Right-to-Work” status is correlated with increased 
structure in bonus practices. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the unionization 
question was added to the MOPS survey based on cognitive testing. Respondents 
during the pretesting period noted that unionized plants are less able to give 
discretionary bonuses and are less structured in their incentives practices more 
broadly. Unionized plants are likely unable to adjust the availability of bonuses in 





unionized in 2005 have less structured bonus practices in 2010 than less unionized 
plants. 
Finally, I utilize the aforementioned sample of establishments of multi-unit 
firms with siblings in the MOPS data to examine firm-level changes in bonus 
practices. I use changes in bonus practices at the rest of the firm as an instrument for 
changes in plant-level bonus practices. I control for rest-of-firm changes in 
employment in order to create a measure of bonus changes that are dictated to the 
establishment by the firm but are not due to firm-level demand shocks. 
Decomposition of Management Practices and Plant Performance 
In this section, I seek to establish that the management score utilized by 
Bloom et al. (2013a) is not unidimensional. That is, the 16 management questions 
may actually measure several different constructs rather than one single concept of 
structured management. Having established this fact, I show that the correlation 
between management scores and outcomes is primarily driven by the behavior of 
practices related to bonuses. In particular, within-plant changes in bonus practices are 
the only practices that are positively and significantly correlated with changes in 
RTFP. The next section builds on the findings of this section by testing the causal 
relationship between bonus practices and productivity. 
The decompositions presented in Figures 3.1 through 3.4 provide insight into 
the behavior of the overall structured management index created by Bloom et al. 
(2013a). Because this measure is a composite of different conceptual practices, it is 
important to consider how decomposing the management score into sub-indices 





In this section, I perform a series of regressions aimed at evaluating the 
relationship between within-plant changes in management and within-plant changes 
in outcomes between 2005 and 2010. I decompose the management index using the 
broad question categories that were the basis of the MOPS and its predecessor, the 
WMS: monitoring, targeting, and incentives (Bloom et al., 2016a). I also consider the 
distinct subcategories of the incentive questions, which are grouped in a way that 
allows for easy classification.39 To validate these conceptual groupings, I utilize two 
variable selection techniques: principal component analysis (PCA) and the Least 
Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator (LASSO). Together, these methods show 
that (a) the management questions on the MOPS survey are not unidimensional, but 
in fact measure several distinct concepts, and (b) the statistical relationship between 
within-plant changes in management practices and within-plant changes in 
productivity is largely explained by responses to questions related to bonus practices. 
This finding could be consistent with the interpretation that bonuses are 
productivity-enhancing, consistent with Lazear (2000). Consider a model where 
bonus practices are a productive input into the production function consistent with 
Bloom et al. (2016c): 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽 𝑒𝑒𝛿𝛿𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 
                                                 
 
39 Question 9 is a screener question for Question 10. Questions 11 and 12 ask about the same broad 
concepts as Questions 9 and 10, with the former pair referring to non-managers and the latter pair 
referring to managers. Questions 13 and 14 ask the same question with reference to non-managers and 
managers, respectively. Questions 15 and 16 ask the same question with reference to non-managers 
and managers, respectively. See Table 3.17 for the text of the MOPS management questions and 





where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is plant-level value added and 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is employment in the pay period 
including March 12. 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the part of productivity that cannot be explained by the 
degree of structure in bonus practices, 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the plant’s capital stock, and 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is 
the degree of structure in bonus practices. Setting the structure of bonus practices is 
an endogenous decision that will depend on the plant’s realization of 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖. 
 Bloom et al. (2016c) assume that structured management practices face 
convex adjustment costs and are irreversible. However, the distribution of bonus 
practices in Figure 3.4 is inconsistent with that interpretation. Bonus practices are 
better interpreted, as per Parent (1999), as flexible. The discretionary nature of 
bonuses suggests that bonuses are likely a function of several environmental factors 
including demand, business/regulatory environment, and managers’ preferences. 
Since demand and regulatory environment can conceivably affect productivity 
through channels other than bonuses, interpreting the productive impact that bonuses 
have on output requires isolating changes in bonuses due to factors that are 
exogenous to productivity. This section focuses on establishing the importance of 
bonuses in studies of management, and the next section attempts to disentangle the 
causal relationship between bonuses and productivity. 
Reduced-Form Relationship between Management Categories and Outcomes 
Table 3.1 displays the results for several reduced-form first-difference 
regressions of management practices and labor productivity. The baseline 









where 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖 is annual value-added at the plant,  𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 is total employment at the plant in the 
pay period including March 12, and 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 is the measure of plant-level management 
practices. I also consider the reduced-form relationship between management 
practices and other outcome variables including total factor productivity (Table 3.2) 
and total employment (Table 3.3), as well as the impact of decomposing 𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 into 
several management practice subcategories. 
Column (1) is consistent with the finding in Bloom et al. (2013a) that within-
plant changes in management practices are positively correlated with labor 
productivity as measured by value-added per worker. In column (1) of Table 3.2, I 
find that the overall management score is positively correlated with a gross output 
measure of total factor productivity from the CMP at the 10% significance level.40 I 
also find that the management score is significantly correlated with employment 
growth between 2005 and 2010 in column (1) of Table 3.3. Roughly speaking, a one 
standard deviation greater increase in the management score is associated with a 0.03 
log point increase in labor productivity, a 0.01 log point increase in total factor 
productivity, and a 0.026 log point increase in plant employment from 2005 to 2010. 
Columns (2) through (5) in Tables 3.1 through 3.3 display the effects of 
decomposing the management score into three component sub-indices: monitoring, 
targeting, and incentives. Columns (2) through (4) regress change in outcomes on 
each of these sub-indices separately, while column (5) regresses the outcomes on the 
                                                 
 
40 Management scores are positively correlated with total factor productivity when the regression is 
weighted using propensity score weights. See the data appendix for more information about the 





sub-indices which span the domain of the management index. Focusing on column 
(5) in each of these tables, I find that for both labor and total factor productivity, only 
the incentives measure has a statistically significant relationship with plant-level 
outcomes, and this measure is positively correlated with productivity. A one standard 
deviation greater increase in the incentives score is associated with a 0.037 log point 
increase in labor productivity and a smaller increase of 0.013 log points in total factor 
productivity. 
On the other hand, changes in monitoring and incentives practices are both 
positively correlated with employment growth at the establishment level. Changes in 
incentives practices have roughly double the impact on employment growth of 
changes in monitoring practices, with a one standard deviation  greater increase in the 
monitoring score being associated with approximately a 0.008 log point increase in 
employment, and a one standard deviation increase in the incentives score being 
associated with a 0.016 log point increase between 2005 and 2010. 
Columns (6) through (9) in Tables 3.1 through 3.3 further decompose the 
incentives score into components relating to bonuses, promotions, and 
reassignment/dismissal practices, since Figure 3.4 suggests that the incentives 
measure is itself multi-dimensional. Columns (6) through (8) regress changes in 
outcomes on each of these incentives sub-indices separately, while column (9) 
regresses outcomes on the monitoring, targeting, bonuses, promotions, and 
reassignment indices simultaneously. Again, I focus my interpretation on the results 
of the regressions on the full span of the management practices. After decomposing 





relationship between management practice scores and productivity is the plants’ 
scores on questions related to bonus practices. A one standard deviation greater 
increase in the bonus score is associated with a 0.055 log point increase in labor 
productivity and a smaller but still significant (at the 5% level) 0.012 log point 
increase in total factor productivity. 
I find that promotion scores are actually significantly negatively correlated 
with labor productivity; a one standard deviation greater increase in the promotion 
score is associated with a 0.025 log point drop in value added per worker. This could 
suggest that promoting workers exclusively on performance is not optimal for plant 
productivity. 
This decomposition raises important questions about causality. Basu and 
Fernald (2001) provide an overview of the procyclicality of both labor productivity 
and total factor productivity. Incentives practices may also be plausibly cyclical; 
bonus payments are likely procyclical based on the cash flow of the plant or firm. In 
the next section, I address the causal relationship between bonuses and the Great 
Recession more directly. Furthermore, as discussed above, the measures of 
productivity in this paper are revenue measures. Mark-ups will be sensitive to all 
manner of demand shocks, not just aggregate demand shocks, and are reflected in 
these measures of productivity. The model of bonuses outlined above suggests that 
bonuses are also sensitive to the same demand shocks, making disentangling causality 
difficult. 
In Table 3.3, columns (6) through (9) show the relationship between these 





2005 and 2010. Bonus practices are also positively correlated with employment 
growth. Focusing on column (9), a one standard deviation greater increase in bonus 
practices is associated with a 0.031 log point increase in employment from 2005 to 
2010. Additionally, a one standard deviation greater increase in the monitoring score 
is associated with a 0.018  log point increase in employment, while a one standard 
deviation greater increase in the targeting score is associated with a 0.008 log point 
increase in employment, although the latter is only statistically significant at the 10% 
level. 
Why might the adoption of more structured monitoring practices be positively 
correlated with employment growth? The monitoring score consists primarily of 
questions related to the quantity of data reviewed at the plant and the frequency at 
which that data is reviewed. Perhaps monitoring causally increases employment by 
giving the plant prompt feedback about its production processes. However, there are 
plausible non-causal interpretations. For example, perhaps larger plants mechanically 
must gather more data to monitor performance, while smaller plants do not need as 
“structured” data gathering processes, or perhaps having more employees at a plant 
enables the plant to gather more data. 
The results of Tables 3.1 through 3.3 are robust to weighting the 
establishments using propensity scores that measure the likelihood that a 
manufacturing establishment that existed from 2005 to 2010 is in the baseline sample. 
Thus, there is some evidence that bonus practices are the primary driver of the 
relationship between management practices and plant-level outcomes in the 





sample. For more information on the weighted regressions, see the data appendix at 
the end of this chapter. 
As noted above, the results of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 raise questions about the 
direction of causality in the relationship between bonus practices and productivity. 
The use of revenue productivity measures means that the productivity measures in 
this study will be particularly sensitive to demand shocks. As such, I take efforts to 
control for demand shocks that may impact both measures of bonuses and measures 
of revenue productivity. Tables 3.4 through 3.6 introduce a measure of local demand 





� =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1∆𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 , 
where 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 is the predicted change in employment in the plant’s commuting zone 
from 2005 to 2010, based on historical industry employment shares, as in Bartik 
(1991).41 As anticipated, this measure is positively and significantly correlated with 
changes in employment and positively but weakly significantly correlated with 
changes in labor productivity. The results of Tables 3.1 through 3.3 are robust to the 
introduction of this control, with little meaningful difference in the size or 
significance of the regression coefficients. 
The only exception is the coefficient relating reassignment and dismissal 
scores to changes in employment, which is negative and significant at the 10% level, 
                                                 
 





after controlling for the effects of the Bartik shock. A one standard deviation increase 
the reassignment score is associated with a 0.009 log point drop in employment 
between 2005 and 2010. Because an increase in this score means that the 
establishment reassigns or dismisses employees more rapidly in 2010 than in 2005, 
perhaps it is unsurprising that this score would be negatively associated with 
employment changes after controlling for expected changes in local employment. 
Because the outcome variables and various management sub-indices are likely 
to be correlated with demand, I also regress the outcome variables on a full slate of 
interactions between the Bartik measure of demand shocks and the management sub-
indices. The goal of these exercises is to examine whether any of the relationships 
between management practices and outcomes are dependent on local demand. To 
simplify interpretation, I de-mean the Bartik measure in these exercises. 
Table 3.7 revisits the last columns of Tables 3.4 through 3.6 with added 
interaction terms. Naturally, the coefficients on the management sub-indices in Table 
3.7 are consistent in magnitude and significance with the results from the regressions 
in Tables 3.4 through 3.6. Generally, the interaction terms are not significant, with 
one exception. In column (1) of Table 3.7, monitoring scores exhibit a weakly 
significant negative correlation with labor productivity when interacted with the 
demand measure. That is, plants in commuting zones that are subject to less severe 
demand shocks than the average commuting zone display a negative relationship 
between changes in monitoring practices and labor productivity. 
Table 3.8 shows the F statistics associated with Wald’s test for the null 





coefficients of the corresponding interaction terms are jointly equal to zero. In 
column (1), it is clear that the bonus score and the corresponding interaction term are 
highly jointly significant. Turning to column (2) of Table 3.8, bonus scores and their 
associated interaction term are jointly significant at the 10% level with respect to total 
factor productivity. In column (3), bonuses and their associated interaction term are 
jointly significant with respect to employment growth. Bonus scores remain 
positively correlated with outcomes. Monitoring scores and their associated 
interaction term are also jointly significant with respect to employment growth. 
Monitoring structure remains positively correlated with employment size. 
Management Categories as Inputs into Production 
Table 3.9 considers a more structural interpretation of the role that 
management practices play in plant performance. Suppose that the plant-level 
production function is given as 
𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽 𝑒𝑒𝛿𝛿1𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛿𝛿2𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛿𝛿3𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛿𝛿4𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑒𝑒𝛿𝛿5𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 
where, as above, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is plant-level value added and 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is employment in the pay 
period including March 12. 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the part of productivity that cannot be explained by 
structured management practices, 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the plant’s capital stock, and 𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are the plant’s scores on the 
management sub-indices. This model builds on the “management as a technology” 
model of Bloom et al. (2013a) and Bloom, Sadun, and Van Reenen (2016b) by 
treating different management practices as distinct inputs into the production 
function. 








� = 𝛼𝛼 log �
𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
� + (𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼 − 1) log 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛿𝛿1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 
where the productivity term 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 has been replaced with plant-level fixed effects, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖, 
industry-state level exogenous factors, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, and a stochastic residual, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖.42 
Since I am interested in the impact of changes in management practices on 
outcomes between 2005 and 2010, I again take first differences, to obtain 
∆log𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼 ∆log 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + (𝛽𝛽 + 𝛼𝛼 − 1)∆ log 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿1∆𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿2∆𝑀𝑀𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑀𝑀𝑖𝑖
+ 𝛿𝛿3∆𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿4∆𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛿𝛿5∆𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖
+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. 
The establishment-level fixed effects are eliminated by taking first differences, and 
the state-level expected change in employment, 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖, is used to proxy for 
exogenous factors that may impact plant-level productivity. 
This regression is based explicitly on the model in Bloom et al. (2013a), with 
several key differences. First, I do not include the measure of education from the 
MOPS that they include on the right-hand side, although my results are robust to 
including that measure. Similarly, I do not include additional noise controls in the 
model. Naturally, as the focus of this section is on the importance of decomposing the 
management index constructed by Bloom et al. (2013a), I decompose the 
management practice score. Finally, I include the Bartik measure of local demand 
                                                 
 
42 Dividing instead by 𝐾𝐾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝛼𝛼𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝛽𝛽  would make the left-hand side of the equation equal to a measure of 
TFPR, which, under the assumption that the productivity term 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 was similarly replaced with fixed 






shocks in an effort to control for the impact that demand has on revenue-based 
productivity measures and likely has on certain management practices, namely 
bonuses. It should be noted that the coefficients of this model, particularly those on 
labor and capital, cannot be interpreted as elasticities, since labor appears on both the 
left- and right-hand sides of the equation and the regression is estimated using OLS. 
Instead, this specification should serve two purposes: to benchmark the results of this 
paper against Bloom et al. (2013a) and to articulate a possible model of management 
in the plant production function. 
Table 3.9 displays the results of this regression as well as regressions 
considering alternative decompositions of the management score. The results of Table 
3.4 are robust to introducing controls for employment and the capital stock. In fact, 
the magnitudes of the coefficient on the management score and its subsequent 
decompositions are slightly larger than in the previous reduced form regressions. A 
one standard deviation greater increase in capital per worker is associated with a 
0.044 to 0.047 log point increase in labor productivity, depending on the 
decomposition of the management index considered. A one standard deviation 
increase in employment growth is associated with a 0.024 to 0.030 log point decrease 
in labor productivity. 
In column (1), I find that a one standard deviation greater increase in the 
overall management score is associated with a 0.032 log point increase in labor 
productivity. This relationship is primarily driven by the incentives score, a one 
standard deviation greater increase in which is associated with a 0.039 log point 





one standard deviation greater increases in bonuses and promotions yield a 0.06 log 
point increase and 0.026 log point decrease in labor productivity, respectively.  
Alternative Methods of Variable Selection 
The decompositions in Figures 3.3 and 3.4, as well as Tables 3.1 through 3.9, 
are based on conceptual constructs in the MOPS instrument, and the results discussed 
above suggest that the overall management score is not constructed from a 
unidimensional test of structured management practices, but rather reflects several 
different concepts. It is possible, however, that these decompositions do not 
accurately reflect the dimensionality of the first 16 questions on the MOPS. I perform 
several additional tests in this section, including PCA and double LASSO analysis as 
methods of explanatory variable selection. In order to perform these variable selection 
methods, I require that respondents have data for all 16 management questions. As a 
result, the analysis in this subsection utilizes a subsample of approximately 11,400 
establishments from the baseline sample. 
Principal Component Analysis 
PCA is a tool that is used to reduce the number of observed variables to a 
smaller number of uncorrelated constructed variables, called “components.” These 
components are optimally-weighted linear combinations of the observed variables 
such that the first component accounts for the maximum amount of variance in the 
data, the second component accounts for the maximum amount of variance in the data 
not accounted for by the first component, and so on. For the MOPS, the observed data 





The changes in score for each of the 16 management questions are 
standardized prior to computing the PCA. In other words, I first compute the change 
in question score between 2005 and 2010 for each question and each establishment. 
Then, these changes are standardized so that the “change in score” has mean zero and 
standard deviation one for each question. 
Table 3.10 displays the rotated factor pattern for the PCA. Four factors were 
retained having eigenvalues of 1.09 or greater, while the 12 factors that were not 
retained had eigenvalues below 0.98. The retained factors account for 56% of the 
total variance in the management dataset. Items are said to be loaded on a given 
component if the factor loading for that item is 0.4 or greater for that component and 
less than 0.4 for all other components. The first component has seven items loaded to 
it: questions 1-6 and question 8, which corresponds to the monitoring and targeting 
portion of the survey. The second component has four items loaded: the four items 
relating to bonus practices. The third and fourth components correspond to 
reassignment and promotions practices, respectively, each having two items loaded. 
Table 3.11 displays the relationship between management practices and 
outcomes using these four principal components instead of the indices constructed 
based on conceptual subcategories of questions. Although the magnitudes are 
different due to the fact that the changes in management scores were normalized prior 
to constructing the principal components, the results are consistent with what I found 
with the original data. Component 2, which is the component that is analogous with 
bonus practices, is the primary driver of the relationship between productivity and 





a plant that was one standard deviation above the mean change in bonus practices 
from 2005 to 2010 experiences about a 0.05 log point greater change in value added 
per worker, a 0.01 log point greater change in TFP, and a 0.029 percentage point 
greater change in employment versus the respondent with the mean change in bonus 
practices. These results are largely in line with the findings of Tables 3.4, 3.5, 3.6, 
and 3.9. 
Component 1, which corresponds to monitoring and targeting practices, is 
positively and significantly correlated with labor productivity, but the coefficient has 
less than half of the magnitude of the coefficient corresponding to component 2. 
Thus, a plant that was one standard deviation above the mean change in monitoring 
and targeting practices from 2005 to 2010 experiences about a 0.016 log point greater 
change in value added per worker versus the respondent with the mean change in 
monitoring and targeting practices. Component 1 is not significantly correlated with 
TFP, but a one standard deviation greater change in monitoring/targeting practices is 
associated with a 0.019 point greater change in total employment versus the plant 
with the mean change in monitoring/targeting practices. As before, this may be 
because larger plants must gather more data to monitor conditions or because their 
larger workforce enables them to gather more data. 
Component 3 roughly corresponds to reassignment/dismissal practices, and is 
not significantly correlated with outcomes. Component 4 is associated with 
promotion practices and is negatively and significantly correlated with labor 
productivity, though at a small magnitude, roughly equivalent in size to the positive 





change in promotion score will have roughly 0.019 log points less growth in labor 
productivity than a respondent with the mean change in promotion score. 
Double LASSO 
Belloni, Chernozhukov, and Hansen (2014) introduce an alternative method of 
variable selection, a two-step application of the LASSO regression. Given a standard 
linear regression equation 




the LASSO estimator is the solution to 
min
𝛽𝛽










The introduction of the penalty term results in the potential for some regression 
coefficients being set to zero as a form of variable selection. The benefit of this 
selection method over PCA is that the selection takes into account the relationship of 
the independent variables with the dependent variable, rather than selecting only on 
within-sample variation of the independent variables. 
This selection, however, can result in omitted variable bias by eliminating 
regressors with small but significant coefficients. To overcome this issue, Belloni et 
al. (2014) propose a variable selection procedure, the double LASSO, which applies 
the LASSO regression technique twice: once to select covariates that predict the 
dependent variable and once to select covariates that predict a key independent 
variable. Then, the covariates selected in each stage are utilized in a standard linear 





Belloni et al. (2014) refer to this final stage as the post-double-LASSO regression. 
Urminsky, Hansen, and Chernozhukov (2016) provide a useful summary of this 
process, with examples of applications to relevant economics literature. 
Selection of the key independent variable is essential for application of the 
double LASSO technique. In a true differences-in-differences regression, this might 
be the treatment variable. For the case of my first-differences regression, I consider 
the Bartik instrument as the key independent variable, where the other independent 
variables include the scores on each of the 16 management questions, change in 
capital stock, and change in employment. The Bartik instrument is a logical key 
independent variable, as the relationship between economic conditions and the 
management scores is a focus of this paper. 
The choice of penalty parameter λ is also important for this technique, as λ 
sufficiently high will result in the selection of no covariates and λ sufficiently low 
will result in the selection of all covariates. Following Belloni et al. (2014), I select 




where 𝐵𝐵 is the sample size, 𝐾𝐾 is the number of independent variables, Φ−1 is the 
inverse CDF of the standard normal distribution, and 𝜎𝜎𝑀𝑀 is the standard deviation of 
the residuals. To implement selection of this optimal λ, I use code provided by 
Hansen on his webpage.43 







I begin by applying this double LASSO technique to the structural regression 
from part B above. The first LASSO regression solves 
min
𝛼𝛼
��∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼0 −�𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗∆𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
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where ∆𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is the change in score for the jth question for respondent i between 
2005 and 2010. The LASSO regression returns non-zero coefficients for the change 
in capital per worker and the change in employment, as well as for question 12, which 
asks, “In 2005 and 2010, when production targets were met, what percent of 
managers at this establishment received performance bonuses?” 
The second lasso regression solves 
min
𝛾𝛾
��𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 − 𝛾𝛾0 −�𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗∆𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗
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which returns a non-zero coefficient only on the change in total employment. Thus, 
the post-double LASSO regression is simply to perform ordinary least squares on the 
regression equation 
∆𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1∆𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑄𝑄𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,12 + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3∆𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖. 
The results of this post-double-LASSO regression are displayed in column (1) 
of Table 3.12. The question that asks what share of managers receive bonuses 
(Question 12) is strongly and positively correlated with labor productivity. A one 
standard deviation greater increase the score on this question is associated with a 
0.052 log point increase in value added per worker, which is consistent with the 





The fact that the double LASSO procedure only selects the question related to 
the percentage of managers who received bonuses as a covariate from the full set of 
16 management scores reinforces the finding that responses to questions about bonus 
practices are the primary driver of the positive correlation between changes in 
management practices and changes in plant-level labor productivity. Because this 
question asks about the actual allocation of bonuses, not the basis on which bonuses 
are awarded, as in questions 9 and 11, this is suggestive that bonus outcomes are 
correlated with practices, but more general bonus practices are not correlated with 
productivity. 
I also perform the double LASSO procedure for the reduced form regressions 
where the dependent variable is the change in RTFP. For RTFP, none of the 
management question scores receive non-zero coefficients in either the first or second 
stages of the LASSO, and so the results are not reported. 
Three management questions are found to be predictors of change in 
employment. In addition to the question regarding the share of managers who 
received bonuses, they are the question that asks where production display boards 
showing these KPIs were located at the plant (Question 5) and the question that asks 
the basis for managers’ performance bonuses. (Question 11) No variables receive 
non-zero coefficients in the second stage of the LASSO. 
Responses to each of the questions selected in the first stage are positively and 
significantly correlated with employment growth in the post-double-LASSO 
regression. A one standard deviation increase in the score on the question regarding 





standard deviation increases in the two questions regarding managers’ bonuses are 
each associated with approximately 0.02 log point increases in employment. 
Again, these results reinforce the findings that precede them. While responses 
to bonus practices are the primary driver of the relationship between management 
scores and productivity, monitoring practices seem to be correlated with changes in 
employment. The fact that the LASSO procedure selects the display board question as 
the monitoring question associated with changes in employment suggests that the 
relationship between monitoring and employment may be mechanical. Although the 
presence of one or more display boards may be a proxy for other more structured 
monitoring practices, which may in turn lead to higher employment, it is also possible 
that larger plants necessitate the use of display boards, with the number of display 
boards increasing in the number of employees at the plant. A very small plant with 
employees who are all aware of the status of their work is less likely to require a 
display board, while a very large plant with multiple processes running 
simultaneously will similarly facilitate the use of multiple display boards. 
Because the LASSO allows me to select from a large number of potential 
covariates, I repeat this process for a series of variables that correspond to each 
possible response on the MOPS form, rather than focusing on question scores. This 
allows me to examine whether or not changing particular practices in very specific 
ways impacts outcomes. Furthermore, the interpretation of the impact of changing a 
response between 2005 and 2010 depends on the sign of the change, so I analyze the 
direction of changes in each possible response to the 16 management questions on the 





interpretation of the results due to the impact of the Great Recession. For example, 
becoming more structured in bonus practices may be readily interpreted as a 
management change, while becoming less structured in bonus practices, particularly 
through the share of workers receiving bonuses, may more likely be a response to the 
pressures of the Great Recession. 
For example, a plant that did not offer bonuses to managers when targets were 
met in 2005, but did offer them to some share of managers in 2010, more likely 
introduced that practice due to a conscious decision to increase structured 
management practices than did a plant which removed the same practice over the 
same period. The reasons for this interpretation are two-fold: First, the availability of 
bonuses is likely impacted by revenues, which fell precipitously over this period. 
Second, there is a sizeable literature to suggest that monetary incentives for 
performance improve performance (e.g. Lazear, 2000), and the person making the 
decision about whether or not to implement a performance bonus program is likely 
aware of that fact, at least informally. While it is possible that a plant tried a 
performance bonus program in 2005 and found it to be unsuccessful, the incentives 
literature would suggest this is a less likely explanation. Of course, this interpretation 
is not guaranteed to be correct, and I pursue some techniques for considering 
causality more directly in the next section. 
I use the double LASSO selection tool again to select from a large number of 
potential covariates. I introduce a pair of dummy variables for each possible response. 
A response is said to be switched “on” if it was selected in 2010 but not in 2005, and 





respondent who switched the response “on” and zero otherwise. Conversely, a 
response is said to be switched “off” if it was selected in 2005 but not in 2010, and a 
similar dummy variable is created. This increases the number of potential covariates 
from the first 16 questions of the MOPS to 148, two for each of the 74 potential 
responses to the questions. 
The first-stage LASSO regression solves 
min
𝛼𝛼












where 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇_𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is equal to one if respondent i turns “on” response j and 
equal to zero otherwise, and 𝑀𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐵𝐵𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑇𝑇_𝐵𝐵𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑂𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 is equal to one if respondent i 
switches “off” response j and equals zero otherwise. This process results in the 
selection of only two predictors of labor productivity from the set of management 
dummies. First, the process selects the dummy that indicates that the respondent 
offered performance bonuses to managers on some basis in 2005 but did not offer 
them in 2010. (Question 11, Response 5, “on”) Second, the first stage of the LASSO 
selects the dummy that indicates that the respondent offered all managers bonuses 
when targets were met in 2005 and did not offer them to all managers in 2010. 
(Question 12, Response 5, “off”) Change in capital per worker also a receives non-
zero coefficient in the first stage of the LASSO. 



















This selection process again returns a non-zero coefficient on change in employment. 
When change in labor productivity is the dependent variable, the post-double-
LASSO regression equation includes the Bartik instrument, change in capital per 
worker, and the dummies for the two aforementioned responses. The results for this 
regression are given in Table 3.13, column (1). Switching from offering performance 
bonuses for managers on some basis in 2005 to not offering performance bonuses in 
2010 was associated with approximately a 0.198 log point decline in labor 
productivity, while changing from offering bonuses to 100% of managers when 
targets were met to offering those bonuses to a smaller share of managers was 
associated with a 0.142 log point decline in value added per worker. 
These results suggest that the primary drivers of the relationship between 
changes in management responses and changes in plant-level labor productivity are 
the plants’ reducing the availability of bonuses. This suggests that the adoption of 
structured bonus practices over this period did not have a positive causal impact on 
labor productivity. Shocks that affect plants’ liquidity and ability to pay bonuses are 
associated with changes in productivity, but it seems unlikely that changes in 
management practices are actually driving changes in productivity. 
As before, I repeat the exercise where total factor productivity is the 





selected as predictors of RTFP or of the Bartik instrument. Thus, I do not perform the 
post-double-LASSO regression in which TFP is the dependent variable. 
Finally, I perform the double LASSO analysis with employment growth as the 
dependent variable. The first stage of the LASSO results in the selection of four 
response dummies as predictors of changes in employment. These include having 
targets that became possible to achieve without much effort (Question 7, Response 1, 
“on”), no longer offering bonuses to managers (Question 11, Response 5, “on”), no 
longer offering promotions to non-managers (Question 13, Response 4, “on”), and 
changing to rarely or never reassigning under-performing non-managers (Question 
15, Response 3, “on”). 
Interestingly, no monitoring practices are selected in the first stage of the 
LASSO, despite such practices being correlated with employment outcomes in Tables 
3.3, 3.6, 3.7, 3.11, and 3.12. I hypothesize that this is due to the magnitudes of the 
coefficients associated with the dummies for the directions of changes in incentive 
practices. Although I find that monitoring practices are positively correlated with 
employment elsewhere, the LASSO will select only those covariates that are most 
correlated with the outcome variable and will exclude other correlates due to the 
penalty associated with inclusion of additional dependent variables. Because 
decreasing structure in incentive practices is very strongly negatively correlated with 
changes in employment, the directional changes in monitoring practices are excluded. 
All of the aforementioned response dummies are found to be significantly 
correlated with changes in employment at the 1% significance level in the post-





For targeting practices, targets being achievable without much effort in 2010 (versus 
requiring more effort to achieve targets in 2005) was associated with approximately a 
0.177 log point drop in employment. This suggests that establishments’ targets 
becoming less stringent was correlated with decreasing employment between 2005 
and 2010. For incentive practices, performance bonuses no longer being available to 
managers on any basis was associated a 0.181 log point decline in employment, and 
no longer offering opportunities for promotion to non-managers was associated with 
an extremely large 0.361 log-point decline in employment. 
Curiously, respondents who reported changing to rarely or never reassigning 
or dismissing under-performing non-managers exhibit a 0.291 log point decline in 
employment. Given the very small share of respondents who reported becoming less 
structured in their reassignment and dismissal practices (see Figure 3.4), this effect is 
likely driven by outliers. 
Taken together, the results of this section present a cohesive, if somewhat 
speculative, picture of the relationship between within-plant changes in management 
practices and within-plant changes in outcomes over the period from 2005 to 2010. 
Whether using intuitive categories or more advanced variable selection techniques 
such as PCA or double LASSO, I find that incentives practices, particularly those 
related to the availability of bonuses, drive the relationship between changes in 
management practices and changes in measures of productivity. Specifically, making 
bonuses less available over the Great Recession was associated with an establishment 
displaying declines in productivity, suggesting that outside cyclical forces drove 





causing the changes in productivity. This suggests a more complicated causal 
relationship between management and outcomes than that presented by Bloom et al. 
(2013b), at least for manufacturing establishments in the United States over this 
period. 
Bonus Practices and Productivity 
Having established that the primary driver of the relationship between within-
establishment changes in adoption of structured management practices and within-
establishment changes in productivity is the availability of performance bonuses, I 
now turn to addressing the issue of the causal link between bonuses and the Great 
Recession. The relationship between the realization of performance bonuses and 
productivity is potentially a case of reverse causality: Do bonuses drive higher 
productivity by incentivizing workers or do negative productivity shocks reduce the 
ability of the establishment to pay performance bonuses? This question is of interest 
not only within the empirical management literature. If bonus practices are a channel 
by which financial conditions causally drive decreases in productivity, this is a 
potential amplifier of macroeconomic shocks. If, on the other hand, bonus practices 
are merely a symptom of macroeconomic conditions, this would suggest that for U.S. 
manufacturing plants, removing performance bonuses is not necessarily productivity 
reducing. One possible hypothesis that is consistent with both the traditional 
principal-agent model, where bonuses are productivity-enhancing during periods of 
economic growth, and the finding that removing bonuses is not productivity-reducing 
during recessions is that the penalty associated with exerting low effort during 





for aligning the incentives of workers and firms. Lazear, Shaw, and Stanton (2016) 
provide some evidence for this hypothesis showing that for a single firm with no 
incentive pay scheme, workers increased labor productivity in response to the Great 
Recession. 
I start by using instrumental variables to isolated how difference components 
of changes in bonus practices are related to changes in productivity. By using the 
Bartik shock measure as an instrument for the bonus score, I first show that a portion 
of bonuses that can be explained by demand shocks is very strongly positively 
correlated with labor productivity. I then use unionization at the start of the period as 
an instrument for later bonus practices to show that a part of bonus practices that is 
exogenous to changes in demand is not significantly correlated with outcomes. 
Finally, I utilize the unique mailing strategy of the MOPS discussed in 
Chapter 2 to attempt to address causality. As I discussed, the MOPS is fairly unique 
amongst Census surveys in that the survey instrument is mailed directly to the 
physical address of the respondent plant rather than the business address of the parent 
firm. This yields significant within-firm heterogeneity in responses from plants with 
siblings in the MOPS sample. Using responses from multi-unit firms with multiple 
establishments in the MOPS sample, I show that bonus practices are determined, at 
least partially, at the firm level. After showing this, I attempt to isolate the 
relationship between productivity and the portion of changes in bonus practices that 





Demand-Driven Bonus Changes 
I begin by using the Bartik shock measure as an instrument for changes in 
bonus practices. In the top panel of Table 3.14, I display the results for the first-stage 
IV regression in which I regress the change in bonus scores from 2005 to 2010 on the 
Bartik shock. In the case where the dependent variable in the second stage is change 
in labor productivity, I control for the change in log capital per worker and change in 
log employment in the first stage. 
Local demand is positively and significantly correlated with changes in bonus 
practices. Depending on the specification of the regression, a one standard deviation 
increase in the Bartik measure is associated with a small increase of 0.005 to 0.006 
log points in the bonus score, or about 3% of a standard deviation for the bonus 
measure. The F-statistic associated with the first-stage is 7.374 in the model that also 
includes capital and labor. This value is low, but significant. In the model without 
capital and labor, the F-statistic is significant and greater than 10. 
In the second stage, the portion of bonuses that is explained by local demand 
shocks is positively and significantly correlated with labor productivity and 
employment changes, although the former correlation is significant only at the 10% 
level. However, the magnitudes of the coefficients on the local demand-driven 
portion of bonus changes are much larger than the coefficients associated with 
changes in bonus practices in previous specifications. Even the very small 0.005 log 
point increase in bonus scores described above is associated with a 0.019 log point 





the share of bonus practices explained by changes in local demand is not significantly 
correlated with changes in RTFP. 
Although the Bartik shock measure is a measure of plausibly exogenous 
demand changes, the two-stage least squares estimates should not be interpreted as 
describing a causal relationship between bonuses and outcomes. Rather, because both 
employment and revenue value-added are themselves correlated with demand, this 
result suggests that the correlation between bonuses and outcomes may reflect the 
influence that demand has on each of these measures rather than any causal role for 
management. On the other hand, the local demand-driven portion of bonuses is 
negatively, but not significantly correlated with RTFP, which would suggest that 
bonuses are related to RTFP through channels other than local demand. 
This approach displays some limitations. The Bartik measure is a plausibly 
exogenous measure of local demand, but for manufacturing industries, which are 
generally considered tradable, local demand may not be the most appropriate measure 
of demand. At the very least, this local measure captures only a portion of the demand 
shocks that buffeted manufacturing plants during the Great Recession, and these 
estimates provide some insight into the role that demand played in changes in bonus 
practices and outcomes over the period. 
Changes in Bonus Practices for Reasons Other than Demand 
As noted in the preceding chapter, the MOPS was subjected to a rigorous 
pretesting procedure prior to being fielded to respondents. In Chapter 4, I discuss this 
process in more detail. One finding of this pre-testing, for which Bloom et al. (2016a) 





questions on incentives practices depended greatly on whether or not their plant was 
unionized. As a result, a question was added to the MOPS asking respondents what 
share of workers were unionized at the plant in 2005 and 2010. 
I use the share of unionized workers at the plant at the start of the period as an 
instrument for changes in bonus practices. Because approximately 95% of the 
respondents in the sample report no change in unionization between 2005 and 2010, I 
perform this analysis on levels of bonus practice adoption in the cross section. Based 
on respondents’ information shared during cognitive testing, plants that are more 
unionized in 2005 are expected to have less structure in their bonus practices. That is, 
plants are less likely to base bonuses on individual performance and fewer workers 
are likely to be eligible for performance bonuses. 
As expected, in the top panel of Table 3.15, unionization is negatively and 
significantly correlated with changes in bonuses. A one standard deviation increase in 
unionization is associated with a 0.017 to 0.021 log point decrease in the availability 
of bonuses, depending on the specification of the model. The F-statistics for the first-
stage regression in all specifications are very large. 
In the bottom panel of Table 3.15, the share of bonus scores explained by 
unionization is not significantly correlated with labor or total factor productivity. 
Thus, although unionized plants have less structured bonus practices, the differences 
in bonus practices due to unionization are not correlated with productivity. This 






Interestingly, reduced bonus practice structure due to unionization is 
negatively and significantly correlated with employment in 2010. This may indicate 
that establishments that could not adjust labor costs by changing bonus practices were 
forced to lay off more workers during the Great Recession. This is indicative of a 
possible drawback of the instrument: unionization may have reduced productivity as a 
result of the Great Recession through channels other than the availability of bonus 
practices, such as by affecting employment flexibility. This would invalidate the use 
of unionization as an instrument for bonus practices. 
Finally, I hypothesize that bonus decisions are sometimes dictated to the 
plants of multi-unit firms by headquarters. These changes in bonus practices may be 
made in response to financial conditions at the firm. That is, firms facing negative 
demand or financial shocks may reduce bonuses throughout their networks of plants 
as a means of reducing costs. This hypothesis is consistent with findings from Lamont 
(1997) and Giroud and Mueller (2016) that multi-unit firms allocate the effects of 
negative shocks through their networks of establishments. On the other hand, firms 
may introduce structured bonus practices throughout their networks based on the 
desires of management without influence from demand or financial shocks, perhaps 
in hopes of increasing productivity. I focus my analysis on these firm-level 
management changes made for reasons other than demand shocks. 
In order to test this hypothesis, I must first show that bonus practices are 
determined, at least partially, at the firm level. If bonuses are determined entirely at 
the establishment level, then conditions elsewhere in the parent firm’s network will 





consistent across units of the firm, the firm’s bonus decisions may be partially 
external to establishment-specific conditions. 
I regress the change in bonus score on firm fixed effects for the set of 
establishments in the baseline sample that are part of a multi-unit firm, have at least 
one peer establishment in the baseline sample, and have at least one peer 
establishment whose MOPS instrument was filled out by a different individual. The 
last criterion ensures that I am not picking up respondent-level fixed effects. These 
criteria together yield a subsample of approximately 6,800 establishments. 
I find that approximately 31% of changes in bonus practices can be explained 
by firm-level fixed effects. I find that the firm fixed effects remain significant when 
controlling for changes in establishment-level output. Taking the estimate of 45.4% 
measurement error in the MOPS from Bloom et al. (2016a), the true variation in 
changes in bonus practices accounted for by firm-level fixed effects is approximately 
57% (0.31/(1-0.454)). I experiment with including state- and subsector-level fixed 
effects to ensure that the firm identifier is not merely a proxy for geographic or 
industry correlations in the availability of bonus practices. The R2 values associated 
with state and subsector fixed effects are 0.8% and 1.5%, respectively. Bonus 
practices are almost as correlated across plants within the same firm as employment 
or output. Regressing employment and output on firm fixed effects for this sample of 
6,800 establishments returns R2 values of 39%  and 37%, respectively. 
Furthermore, the F-statistic associated with the null hypothesis that the firm-
level fixed effects are jointly uncorrelated with changes in bonus scores is 





at least some role in decisions related to bonus practices. Following Bertrand, Duflo, 
and Mullainathan (2004),44 I verify this finding using a bootstrap evaluation. I 
randomly assign firm identifiers to the subsample of establishments that are part of a 
multi-unit firm, have at least two peer establishments in the baseline sample, and have 
at least one peer establishment whose MOPS instrument was filled out by a different 
individual in the same proportions that the firm identifiers occur in the dataset. 
Estimating the impact of firm fixed effects on bonus scores using these randomized 
identifiers, the p-value associated with the joint significance test is less than 0.05 in 
only 10.5% of 200 trials and is less than 0.01 in only 6 trials. The highest F-statistic 
produced over those 200 trials is 1.13. Thus, changes in bonus practices are likely 
determined to a significant degree at the firm level. 
Having established that bonus practices are determined in part at the firm 
level, I use this fact to examine the causal relationship between bonus practices and 
labor productivity. I use changes in bonus practices at sibling establishments within 
the sample as an instrument for changes in bonus practices at the establishment. I 
include rest-of-firm changes in employment to control for firm-level demand shocks 
as well as the Bartik measure to control for local demand shocks.45 The firm-level 
measures of employment and change in bonus practices are discussed in more detail 
in the data appendix section. 
                                                 
 
44 And a helpful suggestion from Emek Basker. 
45 The results are robust to using firm-level measures of changes in revenue from the revenue-enhanced 





Table 3.16 displays the results of two-stage least squares regressions using the 
change in bonuses at the rest of the firm as an instrument for change in establishment 
bonuses. Regressing the change in establishment-level bonuses on the employment-
weighted measure of the average change in bonuses at the rest of the firm yields a 
positive and significant coefficient on the change in rest-of-firm bonuses. A one 
standard deviation change in the rest-of-firm bonus measure is associated with a 
0.037 log point increase in establishment-level bonuses, or 20% of a standard 
deviation. The F-statistics associated with the first stage regression are very large and 
significant. The change in within-establishment employment is positively correlated 
with the change in bonuses in the specification where it is included, while the change 
in rest-of-firm employment is positively correlated with the change in bonuses in the 
specification that does not include labor or capital. 
In the second panel of Table 3.16, the share of bonuses explained by 
managerial changes in bonuses at the firm level is positively and significantly 
correlated with both changes in labor productivity and changes in employment. This 
suggests that changes in bonus practices for reasons other than demand can have a 
positive impact on outcomes. In conjunction with the results from Table 3.14, this 
would suggest that changes in bonus practices can serve as an amplification method 
for negative demand shocks. A plant that is hit with a negative demand shock reduces 
bonuses, which in turn reduces effort by workers, reducing productivity, revenues, 
and ultimately employment beyond the first-order effects that the shocks have on 





However, caution should be maintained when interpreting the results of Table 
3.16. Although I attempt to account for demand-related changes in bonuses in this 
specification by controlling for both the change in firm-level employment and local 
demand conditions, it is possible that I am not fully controlling for demand. In 
particular, there is the possibility that the exclusion restriction does not hold. Consider 
a plant that experiences a negative shift in productivity. This could force the plant in 
question to reduce bonuses and encourage the firm to decide to cut bonuses at sibling 
plants as well. The productivity shock experienced by the first plant may not be fully 
captured by changes in firm-level employment or the Bartik measure.46 Such a 
scenario is fully compatible with the results presented in Table 3.16.  
This final IV specification suggests that while some of the relationship 
between productivity and bonuses can be explained by the impact of demand on each, 
there may still be a causal relationship between bonuses and productivity. This 
provides evidence that bonuses may amplify negative demand shocks during 
downturns. Plants hit with negative demand shocks reduce their productivity and the 
availability of bonuses in response to that shock. The reduction in bonuses leads to 
reduced worker effort and thus a further reduction in productivity. In the last section 
of this chapter, I conclude and discuss future avenues for this research. 
                                                 
 
46 The results of Table 3.16 are robust to not including the control for establishment-level changes in 
employment. This suggests that establishment-level changes in employment do not contribute strongly 






Conclusions and Future Research 
This paper suggests that during the period between 2005 and 2010, 
manufacturing establishments in the United States did not successfully use the 
structured management practices measured by the MOPS as a means by which to 
increase performance. A key driver of the positive correlation between changes in the 
adoption of structured management practices and changes in within-establishment 
changes in productivity is a decrease in the availability of bonuses. Because the Great 
Recession likely impacted the ability of plants to pay bonuses as well as productivity, 
at least some of the correlation between bonuses and productivity is likely not causal. 
However, there is evidence that between 2005 and 2010, changing bonus practices for 
reasons other than demand did generate changes in productivity at the plant level. 
Instead, this paper suggests that bonuses are an important channel of 
adjustment for plants adversely affected by aggregate conditions. The cyclical 
adjustment of wages is a topic of clear interest to researchers in both labor and 
macroeconomics (e.g. Bewley, 2002; Pissarides, 2009). Bonus practices may be a 
channel by which plants adjust wages even if base wages are sticky during cyclical 
downturns. Since there is evidence of a causal relationship between changes in 
bonuses and changes in productivity, bonuses may therefore serve as an amplification 
channel for cyclical shocks. Because the categorical variables in the MOPS provide 
an imperfect picture of actual changes in bonus practices, a logical next step would be 
to try to generate a useful dataset on bonus payments that could be used to analyze 
cyclical adjustment. The Longitudinal Employer Household Database (LEHD) 





such a dataset. The Bureau of Labor Statistics also has an Employment Cost Trends 
Program which is part of the National Compensation Survey and includes some data 
on bonus pay. (Bishow, 2009) In particular, these measures should allow for more 
timely measures of bonuses, which will help in evaluating causal effects. The LEHD 
in particular will allow me to produce a high-frequency measure of bonuses for an 
extremely large set of U.S. businesses, which I will validate using the MOPS data. 
This paper has established the importance of bonuses in measuring management 
practices. Studying bonuses in more detail is a logical next step. 
Alternatively, a structural approach to assessing the role of bonuses would 
also serve as an important contribution. Once could test the implications of this 
chapter by constructing a simple macroeconomic model that includes bonuses and 
worker effort as choice variables. 
This paper also suggests that a single measure of “management” is insufficient 
for understanding the role that management decisions play in firm and plant 
outcomes. The finding that the causal relationship between within-plant changes in 
this set of structured management practices and within-plant changes in productivity 
cannot be strongly established during the Great Recession does not refute the long-
held belief that management has an important role to play in explaining productivity 
heterogeneity. To the contrary, a more nuanced approach to measuring management 
would be a welcome addition to this growing literature. It is logical to ask whether or 
not specific management practices or sets of practices are determinants of outcomes 
for certain classes of businesses. Examining which practices are correlated with 





contribution to the firm dynamics literature. Several questions on management have 
been included on the 2015 Annual Survey of Entrepreneurs, which could aid in 





Figure 3.1: Distribution of Structured Management Practice Scores, 2005 and 2010 
 
Note: Kernel density estimations. Top and bottom tails have been truncated to prevent disclosure of 
confidential information. 
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of Changes in Structured Management Practice Scores 
within Establishments, 2005 to 2010 
 






Figure 3.3: Distributions of Changes in Monitoring, Targeting, and Incentives 
Practice Scores within Establishments, 2005 to 2010 
 
Note: Kernel density estimations. Top and bottom tails have been truncated to prevent disclosure of 





Figure 3.4: Distributions of Changes in Bonus and Reassignment and Dismissal 
Practice Scores within Establishments, 2005 to 2010 
 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.7: First-Difference Regressions of Management Practices and Outcomes with 
Bartik Shock and Interactions 
Dependent Variable Δ Log (Value Added Per Worker) 
Δ Log 
(Productivity) 
Δ Log (Total 
Employment) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Δ Monitoring 0.027 -0.007 0.092*** 
 (0.055) (0.036) (0.032) 
Δ Targeting 0.059 0.012 0.036* 
 (0.037) (0.022) (0.020) 
Δ Bonuses 0.294*** 0.066** 0.161*** 
 (0.048) (0.029) (0.023) 
Δ Promotions -0.181*** 0.030 -0.049 
 (0.062) (0.048) (0.034) 
Δ Reassignment 0.023 0.007 -0.033* 
 (0.032) (0.019) (0.017) 
Bartik Shock 0.693** -0.060 0.481*** 
 (0.309) (0.167) (0.141) 
Bartik * Δ Monitoring -2.465* -0.930 0.715 
 (1.387) (0.757) (0.626) 
Bartik * Δ Targeting 0.219 0.290 0.559 
 (1.000) (0.553) (0.464) 
Bartik * Δ Bonuses -0.936 -0.252 0.139 
 (1.099) (0.647) (0.527) 
Bartik * Δ Promotions -0.751 0.490 -0.360 
 (1.457) (1.256) (0.761) 
Bartik * Δ 
Reassignment 0.048 -0.413 -0.0185 
 (0.884) (0.551) (0.363) 
Observations 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Notes: The monitoring score is the mean score on questions 1-5 and 8. The targeting score is the mean 
score on questions 6 and 7. The incentives score is the mean score on questions 9-16. The bonus score 
is the mean score on questions 9-12. The promotions score is the mean score on questions 13 and 14. 
The reassignment score is the mean score on questions 15 and 16. The commuting zone-level Bartik 
shock is the de-meaned measure detailed in the data appendix section of this chapter. Number of 
observations rounded to prevent the disclosure of confidential information. Standard errors are 






Table 3.8: Joint Hypothesis Tests for First-Difference Regressions of Management 
Practices and Outcomes with Bartik Shock and Interactions 
Dependent Variable Δ Log (Value Added Per Worker) 
Δ Log 
(Productivity) 
Δ Log (Total 
Employment) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝜷𝜷∆Monitoring = 𝟎𝟎,  1.63 0.79 4.46** 
𝜷𝜷Bartik*∆Monitoring = 𝟎𝟎    
    
𝜷𝜷∆Targeting = 𝟎𝟎,  1.31 0.30 1.90 
𝜷𝜷Bartik*∆Targeting = 𝟎𝟎    
    
𝜷𝜷∆Bonuses = 𝟎𝟎,  18.99*** 2.58* 23.97*** 
𝜷𝜷Bartik*∆Bonuses = 𝟎𝟎    
    
𝜷𝜷∆Promotions = 𝟎𝟎,  4.34** 0.27 1.15 
𝜷𝜷Bartik*∆Promotions = 𝟎𝟎    
    
𝜷𝜷∆Reassignment = 𝟎𝟎,  0.26 0.33 1.93 
𝜷𝜷Bartik*∆Reassignment = 𝟎𝟎    
    
Observations 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Notes: Reported values are the F-statistics of the Wald’s F test for the associated joint hypothesis. The 
denominator degrees of freedom are the number of firm clusters in the sample. The monitoring score is 
the mean score on questions 1-5 and 8. The targeting score is the mean score on questions 6 and 7. The 
incentives score is the mean score on questions 9-16. The bonus score is the mean score on questions 
9-12. The promotions score is the mean score on questions 13 and 14. The reassignment score is the 
mean score on questions 15 and 16. The commuting zone-level Bartik shock is detailed in the data 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.10: Rotated Factor Pattern and Final Communality Estimates from Principal 
Component Analysis of Management Question Scores 
 Components  
MOPS Question 
Number 1 2 3 4 Communality 
1 0.65 * 0.03 0.11 0.10 0.44 
2 0.69 * 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.49 
3 0.75 * 0.04 0.07 0.13 0.58 
4 0.76 * 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.59 
5 0.65 * 0.04 0.11 -0.01 0.44 
6 0.61 * 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.39 
7 0.14 0.03 0.05 0.12 0.04 
8 0.72 * 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.56 
9 0.03 0.72 * 0.05 0.01 0.52 
10 0.09 0.79 * 0.05 -0.01 0.64 
11 0.00 0.65 * -0.04 0.06 0.43 
12 0.10 0.78 * 0.02 0.06 0.62 
13 0.18 0.06 0.09 0.85 * 0.76 
14 0.16 0.03 0.14 0.84 * 0.76 
15 0.22 0.03 0.88 * 0.15 0.84 
16 0.21 0.02 0.89 * 0.14 0.85 
Observations:     11,400 
Notes: Communality is the percent of variance for the given question that is accounted for in the four 
retained components. Question scores are the difference in 2010 and 2005 scores, which are then 
normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. Question loads are considered significant if 
the factor loading was greater than 0.4 for the given component and less than 0.4 for all others. 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.12: Post-Double-LASSO by Question 
Dependent Variable Δ Log (Value Added Per Worker) 
Δ Log (Total 
Employment) 
 (1) (2) 




   




   
Δ “Percent of Managers who 
Received Bonuses” Score 
0.186*** 0.071*** 
(0.031) (0.016) 
   
Δ Log (Capital per Worker) 0.098***  
 (0.030)  
   
Δ Log (Employment) -0.076**  
 (0.035)  





Observations 11,400 11,400 
Notes: Questions are detailed in Table 3.17. The commuting zone-level Bartik shock is detailed in the 
data appendix section of this chapter. Number of observations rounded to prevent the disclosure of 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.14: Bartik Shock as an Instrument for Bonus Practices 
First Stage 
 
Dependent Variable Δ Bonuses 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) 
Bartik Shock 0.116*** 0.141*** 0.141*** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) 
    
Δ Log (Capital per Worker) 0.003   
 (0.007)   
    
Δ Log (Employment) 0.041***   
 (0.006)   
First-stage F-value 7.374*** 10.962*** 10.962*** 
    
Second Stage 
    
Dependent Variable Δ Log (Value Added Per Worker) 
Δ Log 
(Productivity) 
Δ Log (Total 
Employment) 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
Δ Bonuses 3.770* -1.384 4.528*** 
 (2.289) (0.961) (1.481) 
    
Δ Log (Capital per Worker) 0.089***   
 (0.034)   
    
Δ Log (Employment) -0.217**   
 (0.102)   
Observations 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Notes: The sample consists of all establishments in the baseline sample with are part of a multi-unit 
firm with establishments in at least one other state in 2005. The bonus score is the mean score on 
questions 9-12, instrumented by the commuting zone-level Bartik shock. The commuting zone-level 
Bartik shock is detailed in the data appendix section of this chapter. Number of observations rounded 






Table 3.15: Unionization as an Instrument for Bonus Practices 
First Stage 
 
Dependent Variable 2010 Bonuses 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) 
Unionization, 2005 -0.067*** -0.055*** -0.055*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
    
Log (2010 Capital per 
Worker) 
0.030***   
(0.004)   
    
Log (2010 Employment) 0.037***   
 (0.003)   
    
Bartik Shock 0.097 0.075 0.075 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
First-stage F-value 49.000*** 32.365*** 32.365*** 
    
Second Stage 
    
Dependent Variable Log (2010 Value Added Per Worker) 
Log (2010 
Productivity) 
Log (2010 Total 
Employment) 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
2010 Bonuses 0.418 0.312 -4.773*** 
 (0.400) (0.248) (0.996) 
    
Log (2010 Capital per 
Worker) 
0.254***   
(0.016)   
    
Log (2010 Employment) -0.008   
 (0.017)   
    
Bartik Shock -0.008 -0.044 0.900*** 
 (0.187) (0.100) (0.165) 
Observations 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Notes: The sample consists of all establishments in the baseline sample with are part of a multi-unit 
firm with establishments in at least one other state in 2005. The bonus score is the mean score on 
questions 9-12, instrumented by the share of unionized workers at the plant in 2005. The commuting 
zone-level Bartik shock is detailed in the data appendix section of this chapter. Number of observations 







Table 3.16: Firm-level Bonus Decisions as an Instrument for Bonus Practices 
First Stage 
 
Dependent Variable Δ Bonuses 
 (1.1) (1.2) (1.3) 
Δ Rest-of-Firm Bonuses 0.425*** 0.430*** 0.430*** 
 (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) 
    
Δ Log (Capital per Worker) -0.005   
 (0.007)   
    
Δ Log (Employment) 0.016**   
 (0.008)   
    
Δ Log (Rest-of-Firm 
Employment) 
0.010 0.016** 0.016** 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) 
    
Bartik Shock 0.053 0.060 0.060 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
First-stage F-value 85.654*** 89.411*** 89.411*** 
    
Second Stage 
    
Dependent Variable 





Δ Log (Total 
Employment) 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
Δ Bonuses 1.144*** 0.072 0.588*** 
 (0.400) (0.277) (0.214) 
    
Δ Log (Capital per Worker) 0.048   
 (0.045)   
    
Δ Log (Employment) -0.165***   
 (0.054)   
    
Δ Log (Rest-of-Firm 
Employment) 
0.080 -0.031 0.324*** 
(0.055) (0.034) (0.025) 
    
Bartik Shock 0.539* -0.130 0.356*** 
 (0.300) (0.152) (0.112) 





Notes: The sample consists of all establishments in the baseline sample with are part of a multi-unit 
firm with establishments in at least one other state in 2005. The bonus score is the mean score on 
questions 9-12, instrumented by the employment-weighted change in bonus scores at other plants in 
the same firm within the MOPS sample. The commuting zone-level Bartik shock is detailed in the data 
appendix section of this chapter. Number of observations rounded to prevent the disclosure of 
confidential information. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
Appendix: MOPS Management Scores 
For the purpose of this chapter, management practices are measured according 
to the first sixteen questions on the MOPS instrument. The overall “management 
index” is, as in Bloom et al. (2013a), a simple average of the min-max normalized 
responses to these sixteen questions.47 I decompose the Bloom et al. (2013a) index 
into several sub-indices: monitoring, a simple average of the min-max normalized 
responses to questions one through five and eight; targeting, a simple average of the 
min-max normalized responses to questions six and seven; and incentives, a simple 
average of the responses to questions nine through 16. The incentives index is further 
decomposed into three subsets of questions: questions pertaining to bonus practices 
(nine through 12), questions pertaining to promotions (13 and 14), and questions 
pertaining to re-assignment and dismissal practices (15 and 16). The text of these 
sixteen questions and associated responses, along with the min-max normalized 
scores assigned to each response according to Bloom et al. (2013a) can be found in 
Table 3.17. Information on the development of the MOPS survey can be found in 
Buffington et al. (2016a) 
                                                 
 
47 Min-max normalization normalizes the responses to each question to have the range [0,1] with equal 
distance between the values of each response within each item. (OECD, 2008) For the MOPS, min-
max normalization is performed by first ranking the responses from least- to most-structured. The min-
max normalized score would then be the response ranking minus the lowest ranking (one) divided by 





As noted in the section on the decomposition of management scores, the 
results of this paper are robust to several different treatments of the data, including 
the use of these constructed indices, principal component analysis, and LASSO 
techniques. The data appendix to this chapter includes additional robustness checks, 
including propensity score weighting, controls for recall bias, and a discussion of 
alternative specifications of the Bartik shock






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The analysis in this paper relies on survey data which includes a recall 
component. For all management questions on the MOPS survey, respondents are 
asked about their practices in 2010 (reference period) and 2005 (recall). In order to 
exploit the within-establishment changes in practices to examine the impact of the 
Great Recession on those practices, I use reported changes between the reference 
period and the recall data. 
Naturally, this raises concerns about the impact of recall bias on the results 
herein. Recall bias in economic survey data can impact empirical results (Horvath, 
1982; Oyer, 2004). To control for recall bias, I utilize two additional questions from 
the MOPS instrument. 
First, the respondent is asked to report her first year worked at the 
establishment. This variable may be correlated with recall bias, but its effects are 
unclear. A respondent who worked at the establishment in 2005 may provide more 
accurate recall data than someone who did not work there if the latter person guesses 
at the data. On the other hand, the latter person may check paper records or otherwise 
verify recall data since she otherwise would not have any recollection of the 
management practices at the establishment, which may be more accurate than the 
memory of a person who did work at the establishment in 2005. As will be discussed 
in the next chapter, in cognitive testing of the survey, respondents inconsistently 






flag equal to one if the respondent reported starting work at the establishment in 2005 
or earlier and equal to zero if she reported that she started working at the 
establishment in 2006 or later. 
Second, respondents are asked to report their March 12 pay period 
employment for 2005. The same question appears on the 2005 ASM survey form. For 
the samples in this paper, I require that all establishments have employment data in 





If the difference between the two employment measures is of mod 10, I assume that 
the respondent had the correct employment but accidentally added too many or two 
few zeros, and I manually set the bias to zero. Regression results are robust to 
including the tenure flag and the bias estimate as additional controls. 
 Table 3.20 shows that the bias measure is decreasing in establishment 
employment size. This is particularly true for the mass of establishments which have 
discrepancies between their MOPS and ASM employment of greater than 33%. This 
result is robust to the inclusion of the tenure flag and the tenure flag interacted with 
employment size. Neither the tenure flag nor the interaction term are significantly 
correlated with the bias measure. 
This correlation between employment size and recall bias becomes an issue 
when weighting the regressions using propensity scores. One of the major criteria for 
inclusion in the ASM sample is employment size. Thus, when weighting responses 






likely to be over weighted. Additionally, the requirement that all establishments in the 
baseline sample be continuing establishments further biases this sample towards large 
establishments. 
Thus, if small establishments in terms of number of employees exhibit higher 
recall bias, weighting the sample will amplify the effects of recall bias. Table 3.21 
compares the weighted and unweighted reduced form regressions of labor 
productivity on measures of management for the baseline sample plus all 
establishments meeting the baseline sample criteria with the exception of the 
requirement that recall bias be less than 33%. Although the point estimates are quite 
similar between columns (1) and (2) and between columns (3) and (4), the standard 
errors are much higher in the weighted regressions than in the unweighted 
regressions. 
In response, I restrict my baseline sample to be drawn only from the set of 
respondents who have recall bias less than 33%. Results are robust to using a more 
lenient cutoff of recall bias less than 100%. 
Propensity Score Weighting 
The U.S. Census Bureau weights survey data to create population estimates. 
For the purpose of this paper, I do not weight results. Thus, the results contained 
herein do not refer to the population of continuing U.S. manufacturing establishments 
between 2005 and 2010, but rather to the subset of approximately 12,000 
establishments which fit the criteria for inclusion in the baseline sample outlined in 






It is natural to ask whether or not these results can be extended to the general 
population, so I provide limited evidence that these results are robust weighting the 
data to reflect the population of continuing manufacturers. After controlling for 
measurement error as described in above, I generate propensity scores to weight the 
regressions. I take the set of establishments that appear in both the 2005 and 2010 
LBD as the potential sample population. I create a dummy variable for this population 
equal to one if the establishment is in the baseline sample and zero otherwise. I run a 
logistic regression to measure the likelihood that an establishment is in the sample 
based on payroll, multiunit/single unit, NAICS subsector, and employment class. The 
weights are the equal to one over the p-values of this regression. To control for 
changes in industry classification, I utilize the Fort-Klimek time-consistent NAICS 
dataset. (Fort and Klimek, 2016) 
Table 3.22 displays the results of the weighted regression equivalent to the 
unweighted regression results in Table 3.1. Note that the signs and significances of 
variables are quite similar when comparing between these two tables. The coefficients 
are generally larger, and the weighted standard deviations are larger than the 
unweighted standard deviations. This suggests that in the broader population of 
manufacturers management is more strongly correlated with outcomes, although 
bonuses still dominate this relationship. 
Because this weighting gives relatively more weight to establishments that are 
small in terms of employment, it seems that management practices at small 
establishments are more closely tied to size. This effect could be due to small 






practices and outcomes, or due to the fact that small establishments are more likely to 
fall lower on the management distribution. (Bloom et al., 2013a) 
Table 3.23 is the weighted analog to Table 3.7. Interestingly, changes in bonus 
practices are strongly positively correlated with value added per worker in column 
(1), suggesting that for small establishments bonuses are more closely tied to labor 
productivity than local economic conditions. 
Like in Table 3.7, we see that in Table 3.23 bonus scores and their associated 
interaction term are jointly significant with respect to labor productivity, total factor 
productivity, and employment growth. As in Table 3.7, bonus scores are positively 
correlated with employment. Unlike in Table 3.7, in Table 3.23 monitoring scores and 
their associated interaction term are jointly significant with respect to labor 
productivity, total factor productivity, and employment growth. 
These results are largely robust to using the ASM sample weights and 
adjusted MOPS score weights which are available as part of the datasets used to 
produce this research. 
Bartik Shock 
As a measure of local labor market conditions, I construct a measure of 






instrument was first developed by Bartik (1991). For commuting zone z,48 the Bartik 









where 𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖,𝑠𝑠,𝑖𝑖 is period t employment in industry i and commuting zone z. I is the set of 
manufacturing subsectors. As with the propensity score weighting, I utilize the Fort-
Klimek time consistent NAICS industry dataset to minimize issues of changes in 
industry classifications over time. 
Firm-Level Measures of  Bonuses and Employment 
The firm-level measure of change in bonuses is constructed according to 




where ∆𝑀𝑀𝑒𝑒𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵 𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑓 𝑂𝑂𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹 𝐵𝐵𝑜𝑜𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖,𝑓𝑓 is the measure of  changes in bonuses at firm f for all 
establishments other than establishment i. This measure gives more weight to bonus 
decisions made at larger plants, which are likely to have more weight in firms’ bonus-
setting decisions. The firm is identified as the parent firm in 2010. That is, this 
measure includes all establishments were part of the firm in 2010, regardless of 
whether or not the plants were part of that firm in 2005. This measure is constructed 
using only the establishments that are in the MOPS multi-unit sample. The set of 
                                                 
 
48 Commuting zones are defined by the 2000 Commuting Zones produced by the U.S. Department of 







establishments 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝐽 that belong to firm f does not include the full set of 
establishments of the firm, but rather the set of establishments of the firm that are in 
the MOPS baseline sample, have at least one sibling in the MOPS baseline sample, 
and have at least one sibling whose MOPS questionnaire was filled out by a different 
respondent. 
Constructing the firm-level measure of employment follows a similar 
procedure. For firm f, employment in 2010 is the sum of employment at all 
establishments that share the identifier of firm f in 2010. Firm f’s employment in 2005 
is the sum of employment at all establishments that share the identifier of firm f in 
2010 plus all employment at establishments that share that identifier in 2005 but were 
not in business in 2010. That is, the measure includes births of new establishments in 
firm f between 2005 and 2010, continuing establishments that were a part of firm f in 
both 2005 and 2010, continuing establishments that were a part of firm f in 2010 but 
not in 2005, and establishments that were part of firm f in 2005 but closed before 
2010. The rest-of-firm change in employment measure is the change in firm-level 
employment between 2005 and 2010 minus the change in employment at the 
establishment in question over the period. All employment data for this measure 
comes from the LBD.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.20: Recall Bias and Employment Size 
Dependent Variable Recall Bias 
 (1) (2) 
Intercept 34.922*** 109.224*** 
 (1.436) (5.339) 





   
Observations 15,700 3,700 
Notes: Column (1) is the full untrimmed sample. Column (2) removes establishments with recall bias 
less than 33%. Recall bias is defined as the 100*|Recall Employment – Reported 
Employment|/Reported Employment, where recall employment is the number of employees as of the 
March 12, 2005 pay period reported on the MOPS 2010 and reported employment is the equivalent 
value reported on the 2005 ASM. 
 
Table 3.21: Unweighted v. Weighted First-Difference Regressions of Management 
Practices and Labor Productivity, Uncorrected for Recall Bias 
Dependent 
Variable Δ Log (Value Added Per Worker) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Δ Management 0.235*** 0.252   
 (0.060) (0.162)   
Δ Monitoring   0.087* 0.048 
   (0.053) (0.143) 
Δ Targeting   0.020 0.044 
   (0.035) (0.078) 
Δ Bonuses   0.256*** 0.255* 
   (0.047) (0.137) 
Δ Promotions   -0.185*** -0.012 
   (0.058) (0.134) 
Δ Reassignment   0.024 -0.035 
   (0.030) (0.059) 
Observations 15,700 15,700 15,700 15,700 
Weighted No Yes No Yes 
Notes: Sample is not trimmed for recall bias. Weights are propensity score weights as described in the 
data appendix above.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.23: Propensity Score Weighted First-Difference Regressions of Management 
Practices and Outcomes with Bartik Shock and Interactions 
Dependent Variable Δ Log (Value Added Per Worker) 
Δ Log 
(Productivity) 
Δ Log (Total 
Employment) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Δ Monitoring 0.061 0.012 0.359*** 
 (0.164) (0.072) (0.102) 
Δ Targeting 0.071 0.058 0.063 
 (0.082) (0.048) (0.056) 
Δ Bonuses 0.432*** 0.135** 0.191*** 
 (0.090) (0.058) (0.050) 
Δ Promotions -0.073 0.020 -0.028 
 (0.112) (0.082) (0.077) 
Δ Reassignment -0.027 -0.023 -0.003 
 (0.057) (0.035) (0.049) 
Bartik Shock 1.337** 0.639 0.801* 
 (0.643) (0.397) (0.417) 
Bartik * Δ Monitoring -8.292** -2.591 -2.444 
 (3.548) (1.621) (2.335) 
Bartik * Δ Targeting 1.845 0.613 3.516* 
 (1.839) (1.025) (1.846) 
Bartik * Δ Bonuses -0.195 0.458 0.743 
 (2.107) (1.372) (1.168) 
Bartik * Δ Promotions 2.032 1.765 2.290 
 (2.574) (1.734) (2.152) 
Bartik * Δ Reassignment 1.515 -0.075 -2.667* 
 (1.465) (0.988) (1.437) 
Observations 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Notes: The management score is the mean score for all 16 management questions, where responses are 
scored on a 0-1 scale. The monitoring score is the mean score on questions 1-5 and 8. The targeting 
score is the mean score on questions 6 and 7. The incentives score is the mean score on questions 9-16. 
The bonus score is the mean score on questions 9-12. The promotions score is the mean score on 
questions 13 and 14. The reassignment score is the mean score on questions 15 and 16. The 
commuting zone-level Bartik shock is detailed in the data appendix. Number of observations rounded 
to prevent the disclosure of confidential information. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 








Table 3.24: Joint Significance Test for Propensity Score Weighted First-Difference 
Regressions of Management Practices and Outcomes with Bartik Shock and 
Interactions 
Dependent Variable Δ Log (Value Added Per Worker) 
Δ Log 
(Productivity) 
Δ Log (Total 
Employment) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
𝜷𝜷∆Monitoring = 𝟎𝟎,  3.86** 1.29 8.83*** 
𝜷𝜷Bartik*∆Monitoring = 𝟎𝟎    
    
𝜷𝜷∆Targeting = 𝟎𝟎,  0.74 1.00 1.86 
𝜷𝜷Bartik*∆Targeting = 𝟎𝟎    
    
𝜷𝜷∆Bonuses = 𝟎𝟎,  11.68*** 2.76* 7.32*** 
𝜷𝜷Bartik*∆Bonuses = 𝟎𝟎    
    
𝜷𝜷∆Promotions = 𝟎𝟎,  0.62 0.52 0.62 
𝜷𝜷Bartik*∆Promotions = 𝟎𝟎    
    
𝜷𝜷∆Reassignment = 𝟎𝟎,  0.83 0.21 1.76 
𝜷𝜷Bartik*∆Reassignment = 𝟎𝟎    
    
Observations 12,000 12,000 12,000 
Notes: Reported values are the F-statistics of the Wald’s F test for the associated joint hypothesis. The 
denominator degrees of freedom are the number of firm clusters in the sample. The monitoring score is 
the mean score on questions 1-5 and 8. The targeting score is the mean score on questions 6 and 7. The 
incentives score is the mean score on questions 9-16. The bonus score is the mean score on questions 
9-12. The promotions score is the mean score on questions 13 and 14. The reassignment score is the 
mean score on questions 15 and 16. The commuting zone-level Bartik shock is detailed in the data 
appendix. Number of observations rounded to prevent the disclosure of confidential information. 







Chapter 4: The Management and Organizational Practices 
Survey: Cognitive Testing49 
(with Cathy Buffington and Kenny Herrell) 
Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the U.S. Census Bureau uses quality standards to 
guide all stages of data collection. One such quality standard requires that each data 
collection instrument must be tested and refined to ensure that the instrument can be 
understood and answered and does not cause undue burden for the respondents.50 One 
method of pre-testing a survey instrument is via cognitive interviews. Cognitive 
interviews are used to understand the respondents’ thought processes as they work 
through the instrument and to use that knowledge to improve the survey questions. 
(Pick and Brennan; 2015a, b) These thought processes include comprehension of the 
question, retrieval of the relevant information, and mapping the information to the 
provided responses. When working with business surveys, information retrieval often 
relies on gathering data from administrative records or other members of the business, 
and cognitive interviews can be used to evaluate how respondents will gather data to 
complete the instrument. 
                                                 
 
49 This paper is adapted from a working paper co-authored with Cathy Buffington and Kenny Herrell 
and issued as part of the Center for Economic Studies (CES) Working Paper series. (Buffington, 
Herrell, and Ohlmacher; 2016b) 







The MOPS, an overview of which was provided in Chapter 2, and results of 
which were covered in Chapter 3, was tested and refined based on the results of 
cognitive interviews. Because the MOPS measures non-traditional concepts, namely 
the eponymous management and organizational practices, respondent interpretations 
have an outsized impact on the results of the survey relative to more traditional 
Census surveys that measure concrete concepts such as employment and sales. This 
chapter provides insight into interpretation of the MOPS data that will be valuable to 
all researchers who wish to use the data. Copies of the final MOPS 2010 and MOPS 
2015 instruments can be found in the appendices. 
This paper provides a brief overview of the cognitive testing process and 
subsequent refinement of the survey instruments for both the MOPS 2010 and the 
MOPS 2015. In this chapter, I first review the process of refinement for the MOPS 
2010, and then follow with the process for the MOPS 2015. The findings detailed in 
this chapter illuminate the respondents’ interpretation of the MOPS questions and 
provide additional insight into the results presented in the previous chapter. 
MOPS 2010 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the MOPS is a joint project between the Census 
Bureau and an external research team including Nick Bloom (Stanford), Erik 
Brynjolfsson (MIT), and John Van Reenen (MIT). Bloom and Van Reenen proposed 
questions related to management practices for the original MOPS instrument. These 
questions were based on their experiences developing and conducting the first cross-






(WMS). Brynjolfsson helped develop content for the MOPS related to organizational 
practices and the adoption of data-driven decision making. The MOPS was subject to 
internal Census Bureau expert review, two rounds of pretesting interviews, and a 
round of usability testing. 
Expert Review 
The expert review of the MOPS was conducted by the Census Bureau 
(Response Improvement Research Staff (RIRS) in the Office of Economic Planning 
and Innovation) early in the development of the MOPS instrument. Gerver and 
Thomas (2009) wrote a report on the expert review of the MOPS instrument that 
includes both general and question-specific recommendations, which are summarized 
in this subsection. Many of the standardized aspects of the MOPS instrument were 
introduced in response to the recommendations of this expert review, including. 
• Formatting each item as a direct question, 
• Explicitly stating that estimates are acceptable in numerical response 
questions, 
• Referring to the sample period in each question, 
• Placing negative responses and responses that generate a skip pattern at 
the end of response lists, and 
• Grouping like questions together. 
Placing the responses that generate a skip pattern at the end of response lists 
encourages respondents to read to the end of the list and limits the degree to which 






The expert review also suggested considering the “social desirability bias” 
inherent in certain questions. According to Gerver and Thomas (2009), “Social 
desirability bias is the tendency for respondents to reply in a manner that is viewed as 
more favorable.” For example, question one asks “what best describes what happened 
at this establishment when a problem in the production process arose” with possible 
responses “We fixed it but did not take further action”; “We fixed it and took action 
to makes sure that it did not happen again”; “We fixed it and took action to make sure 
that it did not happen again, and had a continuous improvement process to anticipate 
problems like these in advance”; and “No action was taken.” The expert review 
identified the third option as being most favorable, with the fourth option being 
clearly undesirable. No changes were made to the instrument for this particular 
question, however. 
Question two asks “how many key performance indicators were monitored at 
this establishment?” At the time of the expert review, there were three possible 
responses: “1-2 production performance indicators”; “3 or more production 
performance indicators”; and “None.” The expert review suggested that “3 or 
more…” was clearly most socially desirable of these options. In response, the 
granularity of responses was increased to include “3-9 key performance indicators” 
and “10 or more key performance indicators.” This provides an option for 
respondents who monitor more than two indicators but who do not feel that 
monitoring a great number of indicators would be warranted. This change was 
believed to address the issue of social desirability bias since it may not be appropriate 






response is not clearly more desirable than other options, although respondents may 
still identify the null response as undesirable. 
Initially, question six, which asks respondents “what best describes the time 
frame of production targets at [their] establishment,” had four options: “No 
production targets”; “Main focus short term (less than one year) production targets”; 
“Main focus long term (more than three years) production targets”; and “Balanced 
focus on both short term and long term production targets.” The expert review 
suggested that using the phrase “balanced focus” made that response socially 
desirable. Thus, the language was altered to read “Combination of short-term and 
long-term production targets.” 
The expert review also recommended removing the recall component of each 
question to reduce respondent burden, but since examining changes in management 
practices within establishments over time was a key goal of the MOPS, this 
recommendation was not incorporated into the instrument. The recall data is a focal 
point of the analysis in Chapter 3. Recommendations from the expert review that 
were not used immediately to update the survey instrument were subsequently 
evaluated in light of further evidence from pretesting interviews with prospective 
respondents. Table 4.1 includes all recommendations from the expert review by 
question number from the final MOPS 2010 instrument. 
Cognitive Interviews 
Two rounds of cognitive interviews were conducted to further review the 






metropolitan area and 5 respondents in the Chicago, IL area, while the second round 
consisted of 8 interviews in the San Francisco, CA area and 5 interviews in the 
Philadelphia, PA area. Lucia Foster from the Census Bureau’s Center for Economic 
Studies (CES) and members of the research team observed a subsample of these 
interviews. Locations for the cognitive interviews were chosen based on the 
concentration of manufacturing in metro areas, mix of manufacturing industries in 
metro areas, availability of sponsor(s) to observe the cognitive interviews, and 
budgetary concerns. 
The MOPS is somewhat unique among Census surveys, in that instruments for 
establishments of multi-unit firms are mailed to the plant address from the Business 
Register (BR) for the attention of the “plant manager.”51 Most Census surveys are 
sent to the business address, usually headquarters, for distribution among the plants. 
Because the sample frame for the cognitive interviews was the Annual Survey of 
Manufacturing (ASM), cognitive interviews were generally held at that headquarters 
or an administrative unit for multi-unit firms. 
Kristin Stettler of RIRS produced internal Census Bureau documentation of 
the cognitive testing process, which is summarized in this subsection. Stettler (2011) 
states, “The goals of the cognitive interviewing were to determine whether 
respondents understood and answered the draft questionnaire in a manner that meets 
the questionnaire’s intent, identify likely respondents and data retrieval strategies, and 
                                                 
 







identify any other related reporting issues or concerns.” The documentation by 
Stettler (2011) is not as formal as later cognitive testing documentation, largely due to 
time constraints when the MOPS 2010 survey instrument was developed. Some 
changes to the instrument were made based on oral reports, and written 
documentation is not available for some changes and recommendations. Table 4.2 reflects 
the known recommendations from cognitive testing of the MOPS 2010. 
While some respondents stated that they would be unable to provide recall 
data, generally respondents felt that they could reasonably provide the data based on 
either their own experiences or information from a co-worker. The data appendix of 
Chapter 3 discusses a measure of recall bias in the MOPS data. In order to clarify that 
respondents could provide estimates and thereby limit respondent burden, the 
following language was included on the letter that accompanied the MOPS 2010 
instrument in the mail: “Estimates are acceptable when responding to questions on 
this report form.” 
Although some respondents exhibited signs of social desirability bias in 
response to certain questions during the cognitive interviews, the response options 
were not changed since the evidence for social desirability bias was inconclusive. In 
particular, some evidence of social desirability bias was expressed with respect to 
questions 13 and 14. These questions ask respondents about the primary bases for 
promotion of non-managers and managers, respectively, at the establishment. Two of 
the responses for each of these questions include the option that promotions are based 
at least in part on “other factors (for example, tenure or family connections).”  Some 






connections was undesirable. Because the social desirability bias was not consistently 
displayed among respondents, those items were not substantially altered. Evidence 
from the results of the MOPS 2010 indicates that establishments did select responses 
that could be considered less socially desirable than other options. 
The definition of “manager,” clearly a key concept for this survey, was 
clarified based on the results of cognitive testing. In earlier drafts of the MOPS, a 
manager was defined as “someone who is involved in pay and promotions for 
employees who work for them.” However, interviewees indicated that many 
managers do not necessarily have a say in pay and promotions, particularly where 
union influence is strong. This definition was extended to “someone who has 
employees reporting directly to them, with whom they meet on a regular basis, and 
whose pay and promotion they may be involved with.” 
Additionally, in response to the finding from the cognitive testing that 
unionization plays an important role in the determination of management practices at 
the establishment, a question was added to the MOPS after the first round of testing 
asking respondents, “what percent of all employees at the establishment were 
members of a labor union?” This question is used as an instrument for changes in 
bonus practices in Chapter 3, and is supported by empirical evidence from Bloom et 
al. (2016a) that incentives practices are more structured in “Right-to-Work” states 
than in non-“Right-to-Work” states. 
Question 10 (12) asks “when production targets were met, what percentage of 
non-managers (managers) at this establishment received performance bonuses?” 






“performance,” noting that “it was not clear whether ‘performance’ referred to 
individual performance or to plant/company performance.” (Stettler, 2011) The draft 
of the MOPS instrument that was used during testing followed the aforementioned 
questions with a question asking “what were non-managers’ performance bonuses 
usually based on?” with responses including “Their own performance as measured by 
production targets,” “Their team or shift performance as measured by production 
targets,” “Their establishment’s performance as measured by production targets,” and 
“Their company’s performance as measured by production targets.” This question, 
with some slight language modifications and the addition of a response for “No 
performance bonuses,” was moved to appear immediately preceding the question on 
what share of non-managers received bonuses in order to clarify that “performance” 
could refer to performance of the business on several levels. A version of the question 
asking about the basis of bonuses for managers was also added immediately 
preceding the question on what share of managers received performance bonuses. 
Question 7, which asks “how easy or difficult [it was for the] establishment to 
achieve its production targets,” originally had responses such as “Somewhat easy (we 
hit our targets 90% to 99% of the time),” “Neither easy nor difficult (we hit our 
targets 50% to 89% of the time),” and “Somewhat difficult (we hit our targets 10% to 
49% of the time).” Participants in the cognitive interviews noted that they could set 
targets that were not “somewhat easy” but still achieve 90-99% of those targets. Thus, 
the responses were changed to a scale that could more easily be translated to a Likert 
scale, with the “normal” effort exerted by workers at the firm serving as a baseline. 






achieve with normal amount of effort,” and “Possible to achieve with more than 
normal effort.” 
Other changes made in response to cognitive interview observations include 
adding the word “production” to the question “who prioritized or allocated tasks to 
production workers at this establishment” and using boldfaced font for the phrase 
“Mark all that apply” for each of the five questions having that instruction.52 The 
former change addressed confusion expressed by participants in cognitive interviews, 
while the latter change differentiates questions where respondents are encouraged to 
mark all that apply from the rest of the checkbox survey questions which specify that 
respondents should “Check one box for each year.” 
Not all suggested changes were implemented. For example, question 1 
requires respondents to “Check one box for each year” in response to the question 
“what happened …when a problem in the production process arose?” Participants in 
the cognitive interviews noted that production problems are not always met with the 
same response. Similarly, question 5 asks where “production display boards showing 
output and other key performance indicators” were located at the establishment. 
Respondents noted that it was possible to use alternative means to disseminate 
information without having display boards. 
It should be noted that questions 27 and 28 on the MOPS 2010, which ask 
about the availability and use of data to support decision making, were written and 
                                                 
 






added to the instrument after the completion of cognitive testing. These two questions 
were based on existing research by Brynjolfsson on the use of data in decision 
making and were added because they were believed to be complementary to the other 
organizational questions on the MOPS 2010. The questions were based on a survey of 
senior human resource managers at approximately 330 large, publicly traded firms 
conducted in 2008 by Brynjolfsson, Hitt, and Kim (2011) in conjunction with 
McKinsey & Company. These questions were later tested as part of the cognitive 
testing process for the 2015 MOPS, where they are questions 24 and 25, respectively. 
Usability Testing 
The goal of usability testing is to examine potential issues that a respondent 
may have when using an electronic instrument; often, there is often validation of any 
changes made to the instrument after earlier rounds. Because the respondent works 
through the entire electronic survey instrument during the usability testing, it also 
allows for cognitive testing that takes into consideration the survey instrument as a 
whole, rather than focusing on specific questions or sections. 
Dave Tuttle of RIRS prepared a report on usability testing for the MOPS 
2010. (Tuttle, 2011) He reports that no major problems were encountered during the 
usability testing phase, although respondents did not always notice instructions that 
read “select all that apply” for specific questions. Respondents also desired an 
opportunity to view or print a PDF of their responses when reviewing their responses. 
Table 4.3 lists all of the recommendations made as part of the usability testing for the 






after the survey collection ended, we cannot be certain whether or not all 
recommendations were accepted. 
MOPS 2015 
The new questions added to the MOPS 2015 instrument were also subject to 
two rounds of cognitive testing, as well as usability testing for the electronic 
instrument.53 As discussed in Chapter 2, the new questions on the MOPS 2015 are 
concentrated in two sections: “Data in Decision Making” (Section C) and 
“Uncertainty” (Section D). Section C consists of four new questions and the two 
questions on this subject that were added to the MOPS 2010 after cognitive 
interviews were complete. As a result, the full section was tested as part of the 
cognitive testing process for MOPS 2015. Section D consists of eight new questions. 
There were also four new questions added to the “Background Characteristics” 
section of the instrument. 
The new questions in Section C were developed in partnership with 
Brynjolfsson and Kristina McElheran (University of Toronto), who are experts on the 
use of data and technology in decision making. The new questions in Section D were 
developed in partnership with Bloom and Steven Davis (University of Chicago), who 
developed a similar survey with the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
                                                 
 
53 Unlike the MOPS 2010, the MOPS 2015 did not undergo formal expert review due to time 
constraints and the fact that most of the content had already undergone this review for 2010. Although 
the formal expert review was not conducted, the cognitive testing staff provided expert feedback 







The first round of cognitive interviews took place in June 2015 in the 
Washington, DC, Detroit, MI, and Houston, TX metropolitan areas, and the second 
round took place in September and October 2015 in the San Francisco, CA and 
Boston, MA metropolitan areas. The first round of interviews “was exploratory in 
nature and the second round was confirmatory.” (Pick and Brennan; 2015a, b) That is, 
the first round was used to collect information and make changes to the survey 
instrument. The second round was used to validate those changes to the survey 
instrument. A total of 32 establishments participated in cognitive testing; 3 in 
Washington, 8 in Detroit, and 7 each in Houston, San Francisco, and Boston. These 
participants were drawn from 13 different industries (as measured by 3-digit NAICS 
codes) and included both single- and multi-unit establishments. 
As in 2010, the interviews were conducted in person at each establishment, 
with interviews taking approximately 45 minutes to complete. Testing was completed 
by the Census Bureau (Data Collection Methodology and Research Branch 
(DCMRB))54 with Buffington or Ohlmacher from CES serving as observers. 
Members of the research team, including Nick Bloom (Stanford), Erik Brynjolfsson 
(MIT), and Kristina McElheran (University of Toronto), also each observed one or 
more testing visit. 
                                                 
 






Kenneth Pick and Michael Brennan from DCMRB produced internal Census 
Bureau documentation of the findings and recommendations from each round of 
cognitive testing. These findings and the actions taken to develop the MOPS are 
summarized in this subsection. Table 4.4 includes all recommendations from the two 
rounds of cognitive interviews conducted for the MOPS 2015. 
Establishments for testing were selected from the 2014 ASM mail sample. 
Participants in both rounds of cognitive testing can be broadly grouped into two 
categories: establishments that are the sole physical location for their parent firm 
(single-unit) versus establishments that are part of a firm that has multiple physical 
locations (multi-unit). The single-unit establishments interviewed “were generally 
small businesses with family members in numerous positions in upper management,” 
and many performed custom work for their customers, making the generalization 
necessary to complete the MOPS questionnaire difficult for the respondents. (Pick 
and Brennan, 2015a) 
In the first round of testing, the team visited mostly corporate headquarters 
locations when interviewing participants from multi-unit firms, while a deliberate 
effort to visit establishments other than headquarters was made in the second round of 
testing.  As noted above, the MOPS is unique among Census surveys in that it is 
mailed to the establishment address rather than the firm’s headquarters. The MOPS 
survey utilizes this strategy because the content of the MOPS is often specific to the 
plant-level operations and may best be answered by managers at the plants. By 
visiting both headquarters and plant locations of multi-unit firms, the cognitive testing 






instrument. Plant-level addresses and respondent contact information for 
establishments of multi-unit firms were gathered from the “Certification” section of 
responses to the MOPS 2010 and used to prioritize the selection of cases from the 
2014 ASM mail sample for cognitive testing in the second round of interviews. 
Participants in the cognitive testing interviews generally held a position 
related to finance in their firm. Titles for the participants included CFO, plant 
controller, financial reporting manager, and financial analyst. In single-unit firms, 
these were often upper managers but were generally not upper management in multi-
unit firms. The participants generally felt that they would be the primary respondents 
for the survey, but would coordinate with other members of the plant or firm as 
necessary. At single-unit establishments and at the headquarters of multi-unit firms, 
these respondents were the employees who complete the ASM forms, as well as other 
Census Bureau surveys. Respondents who had been in their position for five years or 
more generally had no difficulty with the recall questions, while those with shorter 
tenures would leave recall questions blank, leave the responses unchanged between 
2010 and 2015, or consult with someone who might know the establishment’s 
practices in 2010. 
For the MOPS 2015, cognitive testing interviews focused primarily on 
questions which had not previously been tested as part of the MOPS 2010 testing 
process. In addition to the new questions, the two questions that were added after 
testing of the MOPS 2010 and the screener question for the “Organizational 






As with the 2010 MOPS, many respondents had difficulty understanding 
question 17, “In 2010 and 2015, was the headquarters for this company at the same 
location as this establishment?” Respondents incorrectly interpreted this question as 
asking whether or not the firm had moved between 2010 and 2015, rather than asking 
about co-location between a plant and headquarters for a multi-unit firm. To address 
this issue, the language “In 2010 and 2015” was dropped in the MOPS 2015. 
As noted above, two questions on the use and availability of data to support 
decision making were written for the MOPS 2010 after the completion of cognitive 
testing, and as such were not subject to testing before their inclusion on the survey. 
Thus they were tested during the cognitive testing of the MOPS 2015. Participants 
frequently found these questions vague and were unsure about what kind of “data” 
should be considered. Since participants generally held financial positions in their 
firms, they frequently considered only financial forms of data. Pick and Brennan 
(2015a, b) suggest explicitly stating the type of data that interests the survey sponsors. 
Many respondents also had difficulty differentiating between the “availability” and 
the “use” of data, but some felt that the latter term referred to the establishment’s 
“reliance” on data. The recommendations for change were not accepted in order to 
maintain consistency between the MOPS 2010 and MOPS 2015 instruments. 
A similar issue with the term “data” affects the question 26 on the MOPS 
2015, which asks “who chose what type of data to collect at this establishment.” Prior 
to cognitive testing, the list of possible answers to this question included “Managers 
at other establishments including headquarters” which was modified based on 






clarify that these directives may frequently come from headquarters rather than 
horizontally across the corporate structure. 
The next question in this section asks respondents to “Consider each of the 
following sources of data and rate how frequently each source was used in decision 
making at this establishment.” This question is followed by a question on how 
frequently each of three activities, “Design of new products or services,” “Demand 
forecasting,” and “Supply chain management” were influenced by data analysis and a 
question on how frequently the establishment uses predictive analytics. Pick and 
Brennan (2015a, b) suggest including an option between “monthly” and “yearly” and 
differentiating between “never” and “not applicable,” which could not be done due to 
space constraints on the paper instrument. 
The list of sources of data in question 27 was refined in a fashion similar to 
question 26. Early drafts included sources such as “Production performance 
indicators and instruments,” “Employee-specific performance indicators,” and 
“Employee input feedback.” These terms were not clear to respondents, but based on 
respondent feedback, these responses were replaced with the clearer options, 
“Performance indicators from production technology or instruments,” “Formal or 
informal feedback from managers,” and “Formal or informal feedback from 
production workers.” 
The aforementioned questions on forecasting, including the questions on the 
frequency of data analysis in “design of new products or services” and “demand 
forecasting” and on the frequency of predictive analytics, were difficult for many 






forecasting because they are a “job shop,” where the plant makes custom goods to 
order according to client specifications rather than consistently producing a steady 
stream of identical goods. In these cases, the respondents were also unsure as to 
whether every job would constitute the design of a “new product or service.” 
Many participants in cognitive testing were tentative about providing forecasts 
in Section D – “Uncertainty,” likely due to their reluctance to be inexact on official 
forms, especially given that their roles frequently involved reporting official financial 
data. Unless the business had a formal forecasting group, most participants indicated 
that they were reluctant to forecast beyond the constraints of their available financial 
system. Some respondents indicated that they would only fill out one to three 
forecasts for 2017, were unclear about the meaning of the term “scenarios,” or were 
unclear about the differences between the “High” and “Highest” scenarios or the 
“Low” and “Lowest” scenarios. 
An example was added at the beginning of this section that sought to clarify 
the reporting of possible outcomes and their associated likelihoods, and text was 
added to stress that estimates were acceptable. The instructions and example for this 
section were developed during the confirmatory round of cognitive testing and were 
tested at a small number of establishments during that round, performing well. 
Additional validation of these instructions took place during electronic instrument 
usability testing. 
New questions on background characteristics were also tested. Question 43 
asks, “what percent of all employees at this establishment could be classified” as 






week,” and “cross-trained.” Some respondents had difficulty classifying the workers 
at their firms as “working flexible hours” or being “cross-trained,” but in general 
these terms were understood by respondents who utilize these practices. The list of 
employee classifications was refined based on respondent feedback, as was the list of 
possible responses for the subsequent question which asks whether the production of 
the establishment can best be described as “Job shop,” “Batch production,” “Cellular 
manufacturing,” “Continuous flow (other than cellular manufacturing),” or “Research 
and development or prototyping.” 
Question 45 originally asked whether or not the establishment was “owned by 
a family firm,” but many cognitive interview participants were unclear about or 
misinterpreted the meaning of the term “family firm.” The question was clarified to 
ask if the establishment is “owned 50% or more by its founder(s) or member(s) of a 
founder’s family?” 
Similarly, question 46 originally asked if the establishment was “part of a 
multinational firm which has production establishments in other countries,” but the 
term “multinational” was frequently misinterpreted by participants. Because changing 
the question to ask if the establishment was “part of a firm which has production 
establishments in other countries” is a more specific question without this confusing 
terminology, the word “multinational” was simply dropped from the question. 
Usability Testing 
In addition to the two rounds of cognitive interviews the MOPS 2015 also 






ten establishments in the New York City metro area in February 2016, spanning nine 
different 3-digit NAICS codes. Forty percent of interviews were conducted with 
establishments of multi-unit firms, while sixty percent of interviews involved 
respondents from single-unit firms. Each interview was scheduled to last for 
approximately one hour and was conducted by staff from the DCMRB. Buffington 
and Ohlmacher functioned as observers in New York and Los Angeles, respectively. 
Usability testing focused on the functionality and appearance of the web 
instrument for the MOPS 2015.55 Respondents were asked to complete the full survey 
using the web instrument as if they were not being observed, but to verbalize any 
thoughts that they were having as they responded. The staff from the DCMRB who 
led the usability testing observed the actions and behaviors of respondents, paying 
particular attention to their ability to complete the survey successfully. 
If respondents observed problems with the survey content or simply desired to 
discuss the content, they were encouraged to do so, although that was not the explicit 
purpose of the visits. As a result, the usability testing was able to provide insight in a 
manner similar to the cognitive interviews. A particular focus was placed on Section 
D, especially the example at the beginning of the section which was introduced after 
the second round of cognitive testing. 
Herrell and Mesner (2016) produced documentation of the findings and 
recommendations from the usability testing. This subsection summarizes those 
                                                 
 
55 See Buffington, Hennessy, and Ohlmacher (forthcoming) for more information on the collection and 






findings and recommendations, as well as the actions taken to adjust the MOPS 
electronic instrument following the usability testing. Complete recommendations are 
listed in Table 4.5. 
In general, respondents did not have major issues with usability of the web 
instrument. Most respondents found logging into the survey and navigating through 
the instrument to be straightforward. Many respondents stated that they would print a 
copy of the survey instrument to use as a worksheet before completing the survey 
online, and observed that the web instrument provided them that option. Similarly, 
respondents would generally print a PDF copy of their responses to save for their 
records after the survey was submitted. Some respondents in Los Angeles noted that 
they preferred to complete surveys online because they received instant verification 
that their responses had been successfully submitted after completing the survey. 
Although the instrument tested well with respondents, some usability issues 
were identified and addressed to improve the web instrument before its release into 
the field. For example, on questions where respondents are instructed to select all that 
apply and “never” or “none” is among the available options, the web instrument 
initially prohibited the selection of “never” or “none” with any other option.56 This 
was consistent with the web instrument for MOPS 2010. It was determined that 
selecting “none” or “never” does not necessarily contradict the selection of another 
option. Specifically, consider question 3, which asks “During 2010 and 2015, how 
                                                 
 






frequently were key performance indicators reviewed by managers at this 
establishment?” It is conceivable that certain key performance indicators (KPIs) are 
reviewed “daily,” while another KPI is collected but “never” reviewed. 
Many participants reported that they were unsure if their data was being saved 
as they completed the survey.  Because the default programming of Census web 
survey instruments is to have the respondents’ data saved each time she advances to a 
new screen, the “Next” button at the bottom of each screen that allows respondents to 
proceed to the next question was changed after usability testing to read “Save & 
Continue.”  
When issues occur in responses (such as skipped questions, likelihood values 
that do not properly sum to 100%, etc.) respondents receive error messages called 
“edits” to draw their attention to these issues.57 For example, if the respondent skips 
all or part of a question, when she presses “Save & Continue,” red text will appear at 
the top of the screen asking her to please respond to all questions. All warnings also 
include the text “To ignore these problems, press the Save and Continue button 
again.”58 Some participants in usability interviews did not see this second sentence 
and believed that they could not proceed to the next question without correcting all of 
the warnings. To address this concern, white space was placed between the content of 
the warning and the instruction for how the respondent can ignore the problem. 
                                                 
 
57 We refer to “edits” as “warnings” for clarity. 
58 Because respondents can choose to ignore the warnings, these warnings are considered “soft edits.” 






One important change was made to address an item-specific usability issue. 
The example screen added before question 30 was generally well received from a 
cognitive standpoint, but from a usability standpoint, many respondents tried to enter 
data in the example. In order for the example to be accessible under Section 508, it 
cannot contain a flat image file, as such a file would create a usability issue for a text 
to voice browser. Thus, the example had to contain a pre-filled table in which the user 
can place her cursor within the data entry cells, although she cannot edit the pre-
entered data. To make the example clearer to respondents, a bolded text box was 
added at the top of the screen which reads “This screen contains an example. You will 
be asked to complete this and similar questions on the next four screens.” 
Other usability concerns were identified during testing but the desired changes 
could not be implemented due to the time constraints and the need to prioritize 
changes to the electronic instrument. For example, once respondents have viewed all 
screens containing survey content, they are presented with a review screen. This 
review screen has a very basic presentation, with a list of all 47 question screens and 
the number of errors on each screen in parenthesis next to the names of the screens 
(Figure 4.1). The ASM, for which the MOPS is a supplement with the same mail 
sample, has a much richer interface: questions are listed in a table, and the status of 
each question is listed in the table with clear graphics and color-coding (Figure 4.2). 
Although a review screen analogous to the ASM review screen was desired for 
MOPS, the MOPS 2015 instrument was created based on the MOPS 2010 web 
instrument. At the time that the MOPS 2010 instrument was created, the more 






review screen were discovered during usability testing, it was too late to introduce 
this feature. 
Several cognitive issues were identified during usability testing and later 
addressed. In particular, the order of parts (a) and (b) within questions 27 and 28 were 
reversed when compared to the other question in this survey. These questions asked 
about 2015 before they asked about 2010, whereas the rest of the survey asks about 
2010 and then 2015, at least on the electronic instrument.  (On the paper instrument, 
2010 responses come “first” as they are to the left of 2015 responses.) During 
usability testing, the different order of these questions confused some interviewees 
and thus the order was changed in the electronic instrument to create consistency with 
the rest of the survey; it was too late in the survey development process to change the 
paper instrument.  See Figures 4.3 and 4.5 for a comparison between the paper 
versions of these questions and their electronic counterparts. 
Additionally, the “Frequently Asked Questions” (FAQ) page on the MOPS 
Business Help Site (BHS) was developed in part based on cognitive findings from the 
usability testing.59 Specifically, definitions were introduced for the key terms in 
questions 30-37 such as “products shipped” and “materials, parts, containers, and 
packaging.” These definitions, like the key terms themselves, are identical to the 
terminology used on the ASM. In fact, the language used in the FAQ is limited to 








language that is in use on the MOPS instrument (and therefore tested) or is consistent 
with the materials (BHS, instruments, instructions) for other Census surveys. 
Not all cognitive findings from the usability testing were incorporated into 
changes in the electronic instrument. For example, respondents at new businesses 
were unsure how to complete the questions with recall components. If responses were 
not provided for reference year 2010 questions, then a warning would be generated 
even if the establishment was not in business in 2010. The staff from DCMRB 
suggested either dropping the recall component or introducing a screening question 
(which would not allow responses for 2010 for those establishments that were not 
active in 2010). Since recall is an important part of the MOPS, dropping was not 
considered and introducing a screening question was not feasible given time 
constraints. 
Instead, as noted above, the spacing of the warnings was changed to make it 
clear that respondents have the option of ignoring warnings. Additionally, language 
was added to the FAQ page on the BHS providing answers to the questions “My 
establishment was not in business in 2010. What should I do?” and “I was not an 
employee at this establishment in 2010. What should I do?” This FAQ information 
was also provided to clerks at the National Processing Center who fielded questions 
from respondents. However, researchers should be aware that some respondents who 
responded electronically may have felt compelled to enter recall data even if the 
establishment was not in business or the quality of the recall data was very low. 
Further, DCMRB suggested dropping Section D from the MOPS based on 






to be successful by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta and are considered a key part 
of the MOPS 2015, this recommendation was declined. Respondents generally found 
the example at the start of Section D to be helpful during usability testing, except in 
cases where they did not realize that it was an example. As noted above, a textbox 
was introduced after testing on the example screen for the electronic instrument to 
draw respondents’ attention to the example and further increase the example’s 
efficacy. 
Although not all recommendations gathered from cognitive and usability 
testing were implemented due to time and space constraints and the preferences of the 
survey sponsors to generally preserve comparability across statistical periods and 
with other similar survey instruments, the MOPS 2015 was revised significantly to 
enhance the quality of responses received when the survey went into the field. 
Conclusion 
The MOPS instrument was developed over an iterative process. In keeping 
with the Census Bureau’s quality standards, the instruments for the 2010 and 2015 
MOPS were each subject to multiple rounds of pretesting. The MOPS 2010 
underwent internal expert review and two rounds of cognitive testing before being 
released into the field. New questions for the MOPS 2015 also underwent two rounds 
of cognitive testing and the full MOPS 2015 web instrument was tested for usability. 
Through these rounds of testing, recommendations from experts, specialists, 
and respondents were used to hone the survey into the form that would ultimately be 






into the final survey instruments due to time and resource constraints and 
incompatibility with the survey content goals. Every effort was made to use the 
insights provided by the pretesting processes to improve the MOPS instruments. 





















Figure 4.4: MOPS 2015 Questions 27 and 28 - Electronic Instrument 
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